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ABSTRACT 
In this project we argue that the logic of precaution, embedded in the US drone 
program, fundamentally challenges the logic of reaction embedded in international 
law. We employ a three-step approach in order to substantiate this argument: First, 
we outline methodological tools grounded in post-structuralist discourse theory, and 
aimed at investigating the structuring of particular systems of meaning. We employ 
nodal points, chains of signification and the concept of logics as tools for establishing 
the particular meaning given to the empty signifier of legitimate use of force in the 
two systems. Second, employing these tools to a reading of doctrinal texts and key 
legal frameworks, guided by the construction of analytical pointers drawn from the 
contemporary academic debate on the drone program, we establish the structuring 
logics of the two systems - precaution in the US drone program and reaction under 
international law. The four analytical pointers are knowledge, threat, responsibility 
and accountability. We argue that the logic of precaution in the US drone program is 
conditioned by a radical uncertainty, which co-constitutively structure the 
conception of the terrorist threat as catastrophic and constant, thereby invoking an 
expansion of time, based on radical uncertainty to the system. Under international 
law, we argue that a logic of reaction can be ascertained from the reading of positive 
legal frameworks as well as judicial rulings and advisory opinions from the 
International Court of Justice on both positive and customary law. We establish a 
system which is structured by pre-existing legal vocabularies, arresting the 
conception of time as present, and based on the ability to establish legal compliance 
through the ascertainment of facts and evidence. The conception of threats under 
international law is constructed around acts of aggression and the immediate threat 
to life - conditioning the use of force under self-defence and as a last resort to save 
life. We argue that both rely on a logic of reaction, and that the interdependence 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello under the laws of war establish this logic, as 
they cannot be disjoined when establishing legality of the use of force, even though 
they can be applied. Third, we discuss the challenges between the systems posed by 
these particular logics of precaution and reaction embedded in the two systems. We 
argue that the premise for action is constituted differently in the two systems in their 
conception of time and certainty. We show that the logic of precaution invokes an 
expansion of time in the conception of threats, challenging the logic of reaction 
manifested most significantly in the case of the customary principle of anticipatory 
self-defence under international law. 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INTRODUCING DRONES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Since the war on terror was initiated under then US President George Bush’s 
administration, there has been a significant increase in the use of armed US drones 
abroad. The use of drones has proliferated under the current US President Barack 
Obama’s administration where an estimated of 3.300 al Qaeda, Taliban or other 
terrorist related individuals have been subject to ‘targeted killings’ performed by 
employing armed drones (Byman, 2013). Consequently, the appearance of drones 
and their significance in armed conflicts and war has been much debated in recent 
media and international scholarship. Whereas some deem the drones to be ‘just 
another weapon in the toolbox’ (Henriksen & Ringsmose, 2013), others attribute the 
drones a controversial and radical role in the international political landscape (Sauer 
& Schörnig, 2012). 
In this paper our aim is to critically engage with the questions raised of the legality of 
the US drone program, in order not to evaluate whether drone strikes are strictly 
illegal, but to understand the drone program as symptomatic of a wider process of 
change and normative contestation within international relations. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE US DRONE PROGRAM 
In the aftermath of Iraq and Afghanistan, the US have struggled to “shake off an aura 
of illegality and illegitimacy” (Reus-Smit, 2004: xiii) - a struggle that has been given 
great attention by the Obama administration   (Tjalve, 2012). However, there has 1
been an increasing interest in, and critique of, the US drone program as contesting 
some of the basic principles of international law. This discussion has been concerned 
especially with the US drone program, conducting targeted killings in rural areas of 
Pakistan, Yemen and Sahel. It has caused for an invigoration of the interest in the 
politics of international law, subsequently gathering different disciplines and 
research agendas, seeking to explain the nature of the alleged contestation posed by 
the US drone program to international law (e.g. Kessler & Werner, 2008; de Goede, 
2011). 
Politics and law have often been viewed as distinct domains operating through 
different sets of principles  , and have therefore predominantly been analysed as 2
distinct fields of inquiry. In line with Reus-Smit (2004: 2), we argue that politics is as 
much intertwined with law as it is with all other aspects of political life. This directs 
our attention to the normative foundations of international law as an institution of 
!  As e.g. seen in Obama’s Cairo speech1
!  This distinction relates to the distinction between truth and facts within the 2
domains of law and politics as characterised by normativity.
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international relations. Conceiving international law as an institution, we understand 
it as a framework of rules and norms, which states and non-state actors define and 
redefine their understandings of, through discursive practices (Ibid.: 3). Such an 
approach emphasises international law “as expressions of prevailing conceptions of 
legitimate agency and action […] structuring frameworks for the communicative 
politics of legitimation” (ibid: 5). The central position of customary law in 
establishing legality underpins this point. As international law is both formulated 
through positive and codified legal vocabularies, such as treaties and charters, as well 
as in established customs and opinio juris of states, establishing legality is not only 
reliant on strict interpretations of texts, but relies just as well as on establishing 
compliance with non-codified norms. 
In the same vein, whether the technology of drones in itself entails a causal effect 
leading to qualitative change in the conduct of anti-terrorism or the frameworks of 
international law is not our starting point. Rather, the causal effects, which the 
drones are ascribed within certain discourses, discloses the logics pertaining to a 
certain regime of truth and legitimate action. 
By applying a post-structuralist epistemology, we focus not on ‘Problem-Solving’ 
theories (Cox & Sinclair 1996: 88) seeking explanations to problems within 
rationalist and objectivist paradigms, thereby reinforcing them. Rather we aim to 
provide an analysis that illuminates the connection and commensurability between 
different sets of ideas, their inherent oppositions and the different construction of 
meaning given to common empty concepts. This enables us to present an analysis 
focusing on how such ideas and norms constitute each other and conflict, rather than 
why the drone program do not follow a specific set of ideas held up to be the right 
ideas. 
This approach, does not entail the rejection of any material reality external to 
thought, but rejects the possibility of a theoretical distinction between “discursive 
and non-discursive practices” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 107). 
The question is then not whether the technical capabilities of drones causally leads to 
functional changes, but rather how drones participate in hegemonic logics of anti-
terrorist strategies, and how the technological developments co-constitutively 
construct policies, thereby possibly challenging the inter-subjectivity of international 
institutions. 
Employing a methodological approach that focus on the hegemonic struggle between 
two systems, we distinguish ourselves from the anti-science approach so often 
affiliated with post-structuralist analysis (see Bartelson, 1995 for an epitomic 
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example). We rather aim to show that the epistemological framework of post-
structuralism has much more to offer than just deconstructing everything into 
nothing - especially when it comes to the interplay between institutions and actors in 
international relations. Congruently, our focus is on the contestation by the US drone 
program to the frameworks of international law. We analyse the challenges arising 
from this by establishing an analytical framework, that aims at focusing in detail on 
the commensurability of both systems, rather than only the contingency and 
particularity of each. 
Conceptualising the law complexes and customs that make up the institution of 
international law as a social structure, opens for an investigation into its co-
constitutive relation with the actors of the system. Our conception of the relation 
between structure and agency is understood as a performative relation between the 
two; actors articulate a particular understanding of the structure that have 
consequences for how the structure is understood by other actors (Hansen 2006: 6). 
As such, international law, when concerned with the legitimate use of force, 
constitute nation states as the legitimate actors, as is enshrined in the UN Charter, 
Chapter I & II. And any foreign policy from these actors entails a possibility of 
constituting a challenge as agents constructing a particular system of meaning, 
performatively (re)articulating the structures of international law. 
On an abstract level we can thus argue that both international law as an institution 
and the policies of the US can be understood as different modes of governance;   they 3
constitute and prescribe “regimes of truth” that makes “possible certain courses of 
action [...] while excluding other policies as unintelligible or unworkable” (Milliken, 
1999: 236) through the construction of norms and legitimate practices. 
THE US DRONE PROGRAM – A FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
So whilst authors of strategical and war studies seem more representative for an ‘un-
radical’ understanding of drones (Henriksen & Ringsmose, 2013), authors of critical 
security- and poststructuralist studies have dealt more with how the war on terror 
and the use of drones as part of this rising narrative, signify a normative break with 
sedimented agendas (e.g. Sauer & Schörnig, 2012; Salter, 2013). Belonging to the 
latter group of authors, Barry Buzan & Lene Hansen argue though that “many of the 
policies adopted by Western governments in their defence against ‘terrorism’ were 
!  We conceptualise the notion of ‘mode of governance’ as social and political systems 3
that structure actions, create subjects and provide doxal understandings of what is 
legitimate actions. It is the totality of discourses that are constructed as a common 
imaginary, establishing the boundaries of intersubjective objectivity (Howarth & 
Stavrakakis 2000)
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either in place or on the drawing board prior to 9/11, but the Global War on Terror 
(GWoT) accelerated their introduction and legitimised their application across a 
wider set of issues and areas than would otherwise have been the case” (Buzan & 
Hansen, 2009: 226). Following that line of reasoning, we argue that the logics and 
strategies of the war on terror and here, the drone program of the US, do not signify 
something fundamentally new. The sedimentation and intensification of the pre-
existing policies, however, turns attention to how logics and ideas of right and wrong 
may rise and manifest themselves, and how their development can challenge 
prevailing normative structures and modes of governance, such as the ones 
embedded in the covenants and customs of international law. 
In this paper, we will focus on how drones and the mode of governance they form 
part of, can be understood as constituting a fundamental challenge to the institution 
of international law. 
More specifically, we will argue that: The logic of precaution, embedded in the US’ 
drone program, fundamentally challenges the logic reaction structuring the use of 
lethal force under international law. 
STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER 
The argument we make in this paper is based on an analysis of two discursive 
systems, namely the systems of the US Drone Program under President Obama and 
the system regulating the use of force under International Law, and how these two 
systems fundamentally challenge each other. 
First, we briefly visit the current debate on drones and draw out important concepts 
and analytical categories that are discussed within the literature. We do this as a 
means for directing our analysis of the two systems at the areas that are vital for 
understanding their basic logics; building on existing literature on the subject. 
In order to substantiate this claim, we outline the methodological approach we 
employ in our analysis. This is based on post-structuralist discourse theory aiming at 
making an analysis that does not ascribe essential legitimacy to neither of the 
systems. This is followed by some methodological considerations on how to apply 
this analytical strategy, where we draw on the concepts established from the 
academic debate on drones. 
The analysis that follows is split in two: First, we analyse the particular construction 
of the present US Drone Program, guided by the four analytical pointers laid out in 
the chapter above. Second, we analyse what constitutes legitimate use of force under 
international law guided by the same four concepts. 
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Following each of the two analyses we will establish their particular modes of 
governing the use of force, as a means for mapping out their logics enabling a 
comparison between the two. By showing how the two discourses construct 
particular logics structuring their mode of governance, we enable a discussion of the 
commensurability of the systems. This in turn will enable us to discuss the challenges 
that the US Drone Program pose to international law and vice versa. Concludingly, 
we will show how the logic of precaution embedded in the US drone program, 
conditioned by a radical uncertainty, challenges international law in its logic of 
reaction. 
SIGNIFICANT CONCEPTS IN THE DRONE DEBATE 
In order to establish a stringent analytical framework that enable an analysis of the 
struggle between systems, we identify the pivotal concepts in the academic debate on 
US drone strikes, their legitimacy and their legality under international law, in order 
to establish common contested categories that provide analytical focus. We argue 
that their interpretation within both systems can serve as entry points for 
understanding and analysing legitimate practice or modes of governance within the 
two systems. 
Claudia Aradau & Rens van Munster (2009) have argued, from a Foucauldian point 
of view, that precautionary measures have become an integral part of a dispositif for 
the management of risks such as terror. Dealing also with the inscription of 
precautionary measures in counterterrorism policies, de Goede (2011) shows how the 
invocation of targeted sanctions against individuals and groups suspected of 
financing or supporting terror constitutes exceptional and preemptive measures 
based on suspected affiliation, challenging prevailing logics of criminal responsibility 
and evidence. De Goede then shows how logics of precaution are sought inscribed 
into the international juridical order. Common for these approaches is that they 
analyse the management of the risk or threat posed by terrorism, by looking into 
questions of what constitutes legitimate knowledge and the constructions and 
managements of terrorist threats. 
Kessler & Werner (2008) elaborate on these points within the realm of international 
law. They argue that these new forms of threats blur the boundaries between 
sovereignty and challenge the Westphalian order of plurality, threat management 
and attribution of responsibility. Furthermore, the approaches to alleviate terrorist 
threats through targeted killings and other sanctions, such as blacklisting, arguably 
become even more contested when conducted outside existing, ‘structured’ spaces 
and categories of international law (ibid.). 
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A common point made in the literature on targeted killings is that they challenge the 
distinction between combatant and non-combatant and consequently the categories 
of what constitutes war and thereby the legitimate use of force. The first drone 
strikes undertaken by the Bush administration, were so under the aegis of the ‘Global 
War on Terror’, which has been the basis for much scholarly discussion of its legality 
and categorisation as a war (See Buzan & Hansen, 2009 for a concise account of this 
debate). Following the Obama administration’s rejection of the Global War on Terror 
(Johnson, 2012), the categorisation of targeted killings becomes only more murkier, 
when conducted in scholarly literature. As Gross (2006) rightly points out,   the fact 4
that we even ask the question of whether international humanitarian law or 
international human rights law apply, entails that an uncertainty of categorisation is 
present, and that targeted killings pose significant questions to the frameworks of 
international law.  
Discussing how the framework of international human rights law apply, it is often 
invoked that the use of lethal force on targeted individuals, not party to a warring 
nation, is outside the boundaries of just warfare, and therefore that the framework of 
IHL does not apply, but rather, that “any use of lethal force by designated authorities 
of the United States must follow the normal human rights limits on peacetime resort 
to lethal force” (O’Connell, 2012, in Henriksen & Ringsmose, 2013: 43). Representing 
more than just “combatants cum war criminals” (Gross, 2006: 325), which would fall 
under the aegis of IHL, terrorists are allegedly rather to be considered ‘unlawful’ or 
‘illegal’ combatants   - a category which assigns individuals combatant status, but 5
because of their illegal conduct of war, deducts them the rights of ordinary 
combatants (ibid: 329). Under this label of unlawful combatants, individuals are 
subject to prosecution in the victim state, by converging the two paradigms of IHL 
and IHRL, including questions of responsibility, relying heavily on concepts from the 
criminal paradigm, “particularly conspiracy and aiding and abetting” (Danner 2007: 
9). This ascription of blame underlines the importance of the concept of 
responsibility for wrongful action of individuals or groups, when investigating the 
US drone program. 
!  We find that the analysis by Gross, on the use of targeted killings in Israel and their 4
conceptualisations of the combatant, is comparable to the approach as seen in the 
present Obama administration.
!  An ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ is in the Military Commission Act defined as 5
follows: “ … (i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and 
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co- belligerents who is 
not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al 
Qaeda, or associated forces); or (ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the 
enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an 
unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another 
competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary 
of Defense.” (Military Commission Act of 2006, quoted in Danner, 2008)
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Furthermore, assigning blame and using justifiable lethal force on targeted (and/or 
named) individuals, could under the regulation of IHRL be considered acts of self-
defence. Accepting that lethal force can only be used when there is no other 
alternative implies in an IHRL perspective that principles such as due process, 
presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial is assured (Kretzmer 2005: 
178). Thus questions of accountability - both legal and political - are raised as 
important issues in this debate. 
Niva (2013: 197) argues that the “expanding shadow war of targeted killings and 
drone strikes outside conventional war zones [...] violence is largely disappeared 
from media coverage and political accountability”. The expansion of targeted killings, 
he argues, is not solely constituted  by the use of drones, but instead the drones can 
be perceived of as a ‘synecdoche’ of a broader development of targeted strikes and 
special operations that are carried out in secrecy, unaccountable to the public (Ibid.: 
199). As such, an investigation on the scope of the agenda of the logic of precaution 
prevailing in western states might illuminate a wider agenda of the normative 
contestation and developments of the international sphere. 
The four concepts of knowledge, threat, responsibility and accountability constitute 
core debates in the literature on the US drone program vis-a-vis international law. 
They are invoked as pivotal points of discussion in establishing when use of force is 
legitimate.  
We aim at using the concepts as analytical categories helping us to illuminate the 
ideational differences that underpin the particular understanding of the legitimate 
use of force within the two systems. In the next section, we develop an analytical 
strategy that enable the investigation of these concepts. Doing so, we explain how the 
concepts can be understood and employed as analytical entry-points. 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ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
The four pivotal concepts in the debate of the US drone program, as outlined above, 
will serve as analytical entry-points for investigating what constitutes legitimate uses 
of force under US drone program and international law respectively. In this chapter 
we will outline our analytical strategy, the basic epistemological features of it, as well 
as we operationalise the pivotal concepts within a poststructuralist discourse 
analytical framework. 
We will outline our methodological tools in three steps. First, we will introduce the 
concept of empty signifiers, and show how the legitimate use of force is situated 
centrally within both systems. Second, we will outline how the four concepts from 
above will enable an excavation of the nodal points giving particular meaning to the 
empty signifier of both systems. Third, we will outline how these nodal points are 
situated discursively and together establishes chains of signification, which in their 
particular construction draws boundaries of both systems, thereby establishing 
which uses of force are able to be legitimised. 
Following this, we will shortly outline how this approach differs from the identity 
approach to discourse analysis, and how it contributes to the central discussion of 
the role of institutions within IR and thus, how it can possibly compliment more 
classical approaches. 
Concludingly, we will outline our choice of empirical material for analysing the two 
systems; outlining how we find pivotal documents and practices within both systems. 
THE BASIC CONCEPTS: NODAL POINTS, EMPTY SIGNIFIERS AND CHAINS OF 
SIGNIFICATION 
Inspired by Derridean deconstruction, discourse theory base its framework on a non-
essentialist re-reading of the Gramscian notion of hegemony and the role of 
ideologies in societal change (Howarth, 2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). By rejecting 
the marxist a priori notion of class struggle as something inherently constituted by 
economic classes and modes of production, discourse theory invites us to focus any 
investigation on societal and intersubjectively established logics - without associating 
it with the ‘cloaking of reality’. 
Discourse theory is centrally occupied with the construction of identities in a 
relational manner, where the borders of inside and outside are constantly reaffirmed 
(Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000). The relational nature of social identities underpins 
the structural impossibility of ultimate closure in the social field and at the same 
time, Laclau & Mouffe (1985: 112) emphasise the need for identities based on 
fixational attempts: 
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“Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of 
discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a 
centre.” 
Stressing the ultimate contingent nature of the social field, defined by its ultimate 
impossibility of objective closure and total fixation, the construction of meaning and 
legitimate knowledge are based on the invocation of a series of nodal points, which 
establishes a partial fixation of meaning and thus participate in the struggle for 
establishing hegemony. Conceptualising international law in this manner, is 
underpinned by its own reliance on the constitution of norms, defined through 
customary practices, and as such is not characterised by total fixation, but instead 
through co-constitutive rearticulations, possibly changing or reinforcing the system. 
The relational articulation of nodal points establishes what we define as chains of 
signification, constituted by their particular relational construction to each other. 
The chains of signification establish the discourse; the privileged signified elements, 
the nodal points, and in their total relation create horizons of meaning that structure 
what constitutes legitimate knowledge and action. Thus, changes of invoked nodal 
points in discourse, change the signification and the particular meaning of the 
discourse. 
Empty signifiers conceptualise and accentuates the differential relation between 
different discourses. Referring to political movements, the concept becomes clear - 
justice is invoked in both liberal and socialist discourse, but are given different 
meanings through the particular construction of relations between its constitutive 
elements.   We conceptualise the legitimate use of force as an empty signifier; in 6
order to establish the conflictual relation between the US drone program and 
international law and their understandings of legitimate use of force, we analyse 
what nodal points create specific chains of signification within the discourse, thereby 
establishing a contingent fixation of meaning to the empty signifier. The empty 
signifier of legitimate use of force directs our analysis by focusing our reading of 
material, guided by the analytical pointers. 
We distinguish our approach from the identity approach often applied in discourse 
analysis and foreign policy (e.g. Hansen, 2006). Where this approach focuses on the 
construction of identities, the particular construction of others when formulating 
foreign policies, our aim here is to show the differential construction of a central 
!  Howarth, 2000: 9; Hansen, 2006; An example of changes in chains of signification: 6
Under socialist ideology justice is in a contingent relation with the nodal points of 
communism and equality, whereas under liberal ideology it is related to the nodal 
points of equality and human rationality. Thus, equality is central nodal points in 
both systems, but the intervention of the nodal points of communism and rationality 
change the meaning of the discourse as a consequence of the contingent relation 
between the nodal points in the chains of significations.
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concept within International Relations - namely, how the use of force is legitimised 
and regulated differently within the two modes of governance - enabling us to 
interpret the logics of the two systems. 
LOGICS OF DISCOURSE AND ANALYTICAL POINTERS 
When analysing the meaning given to the empty signifier, we provide an analytical 
construct of logics. Logics refer to the reflexive interpretation of the chains of 
signification, which enable us to discuss the differences between discourses. The 
epistemological function of logics are here understood as “a programmatic way of 
formalizing, justifying and deploying action in the here and now. Logics involve 
action that aims to prevent, mitigate, adapt to, prepare for or preempt specific 
futures” (Anderson, 2010: 779). The logics of precaution and reaction are established 
as overall significations for the two systems that explain semantically how the 
particular constructions of knowledge structure the meaning given to threats, 
accountability, responsibility - ultimately what constitutes legitimate use of force. 
These logics are constructed analytically and serve to distinguish the constructions of 
knowledge and conditions for actions between the two systems. 
The four pivotal concepts of the drone debate in the academic literature will, as 
outlined, serve as analytical pointers that guide the analysis of both systems. Thus, 
they introduce the conflictual relation between the two systems, and we use them as 
pointers for establishing the chains of signification within the discourse. They 
introduce an a priori ontological focus, rather than epistemological guidance. The 
four pointers do not, however, introduce any a priori meaning of the two systems, 
but rather guide the analysis and gathering of empirical material. Furthermore, they 
underline our analytical starting point - that our aim is not to establish an anti-
science approach to understanding the legitimate use of force under both systems, 
concluding in a deconstruction of everything into nothing. We aim to show how an 
approach grounded in discourse theory methodology, can at once show the socially 
productive forces of international institutions and investigate in depth the challenge 
posed by actors and other systems. This is not to relegate the importance of the anti-
science and deconstructionist approaches, that can certainly be beneficial for 
understanding the ‘deeper’ historicist contingency of the objectivist sciences and 
modes of knowledge constituting political life. Rather, our point is to establish an 
analysis that makes possible a discussion of the contemporary constructions of 
legitimate use of force between two differential systems. 
Consequently, the method we apply here is focused not in itself on the legal 
evaluation of the US drone program vis-a-vis international law, nor the evaluation of 
the frameworks of international law as outdated or unable to construe of the real 
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threat of transnational terrorism. Our method necessitates political constructions of 
threats, not as the framing or cloaking of real threats for political purposes, but as 
constructions that establish specific modes of governance, and enables comparison 
between two systems and their challenges to each other. Thus, we do not as such, 
question the the way in which the US perceives of the terrorist threat as inherently 
illegal, wrong or immoral as some would have it, but rather we aim at showing how 
this construction has consequences in the relation to international law. Thus, we 
analyse the two systems apart from each other, in order to establish their particular 
constructions of meanings and challenges. Specifically, we show how this challenge 
and contestation is constituted by two particular constructions of logics and 
meanings. 
CHOOSING TEXTS 
Analysing systems of meaning through the application of discourse theory, leads us 
to focus on articulatory practices. Articulation is any practice that consists in the 
construction of chains of signification, binding together nodal points so as to 
partially fix their meaning (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 113). Ultimately, any social 
practice is articulatory, as it is understood within a specific system of meaning, and 
at the same time performatively construct and rearticulate the structure within which 
it participates. 
For the objective of choosing empirical material to analyse, this allows us to choose 
both practices, texts, speeches, policies, laws and customs as inscriptions of 
discourse, structuring the system of meaning. It becomes a case of showing which 
nodal points specific articulations refer to, and then investigate how they in their 
particular relational construction produce knowledgeable and legitimate practices, 
logics and ultimately structure the legitimate use of force of the system (Milliken, 
1999: 229; Laustsen & Åkerstrom, 2005: 181). 
When analysing the US drone program, in its covert nature, the availability of 
information regarding practices is naturally a complicated process. The precise 
conduct of targeting individuals and the construction of signatures is not publicly 
available and as such, our analysis draws on leaked official documents, accounts by 
other academics on these documents, as well as secondary interviews with 
anonymous officials. For the political legitimation of the drone program, we focus on 
doctrinal texts from officials and politicians, such as President Obama, his chief 
advisors on the drone program, as well as officials from the CIA and US Department 
of Defense. These texts often present calculated and strategic communication, but 
nonetheless establish key nodal points in the legitimation of force, which we evaluate 
using leaked and anonymous documents. 
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Within international law, the material considered consists of both positive law and 
customary law. Referring to practices, which are considered legitimate, without clear 
codification in positive law, customary law refers to the practices within the system 
that have become part of legitimate knowledge and action. We draw on both 
doctrinal texts, such as the UN Charter, The Geneva Conventions, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as rulings and opinions by 
the International Court of Justice, the chief judicial body within the UN, ruling on 
the legality of actions as well as providing advisory opinions on the interpretation of 
positive and customary law. The above mentioned treaties and conventions establish 
the key texts under international law, concerning legitimate recourse to force, where 
customary law is hierarchically subordinate to positive law as formulated by the ICJ 
in its judicial function. 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US DRONE PROGRAM 
This chapter will argue that the method of targeted killings and especially, signature 
strikes, manifest the precautionary logic embedded in the approach by which the 
Obama administration seeks to tame the radical uncertainty of the terrorist threat. 
Our argument will be structured in the following way: 
Understanding the mode of governance that structure the use of force in the US 
drone program, we first enquire into the regime of knowledge, upon which methods 
are constructed to depict, tame and understand reality. Here we will look first at the 
context in which the drone program arose and move on to analyse how the drone 
program is carried out, what methods are used and thus establish what nodal points 
are situated in chains of signification, giving meaning to the general logic of the 
system. 
What is considered legitimate knowledge has substantial influence on the 
construction and the particular understanding of threats. This will be analysed in the 
second section of the chapter focusing on threats. This have lead to focus rather 
narrowly on the threat of terrorism, being the central concern in relation to the US 
drone program. Doing this, we will argue that the threat of terrorism is characterised 
by radical uncertainty, worst case scenarios and imminence; giving rise to a 
constancy of the threat. 
The attribution of responsibility and guilt for terrorism will be addressed in the third 
section of this chapter. It will be argued that the certainty with which individual 
responsibility for (anticipated) terrorist actions is ascribed to an individual, is still 
structured by the radical uncertainty structuring the definition of imminence. 
In the fourth section of the chapter, we analyse how political accountability in the US 
drone program is handled and structured. It will be argued that the concept of 
security have largely been equated with that of secrecy within the Obama 
administration. This have led to a new form of accountability not structured through 
processes of checks and balances and rules of transparency but rather with 
guarantees and presidential responsibility. 
Concludingly we will establish how the nodal points of the different sections make up 
a particular chain of signification showing how the logic of precaution, embedded in 
the US drone program, is manifested in the discourse. We will show this graphically 
by mapping out the different nodal points and their particular relation. 
!18
KNOWLEDGE - DETERMINING AN ANTICIPATED FUTURE 
In this first section, we will unfold the context to which the logics of the US drone 
program is structured. We will do this by shortly outlining the roots of this program 
and the political environment in which it is constructed. We will argue that the 
understanding of the 9/11 events as catastrophic introduced terrorism as a new 
threat characterised by radical uncertainty against which extraordinary means can 
legitimately be used. This paves the way for the introduction of precautionary 
measures in which new ways of knowing and acting upon the future are given 
legitimacy. 
We show how the understanding of precaution is embedded in the US drone 
program by examining the ways in which the policy of targeting killings and 
especially, signature strikes, are articulated as and conditioned by conjectural  7
reasoning, and anticipatory action. 
KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
In what some authors have defined as ‘the age of nuclear weapons’, catastrophe has, 
as an object of governance, been treated with great curiosity in academic literature 
(Aradau & Munster, 2011: 1). Particularly post 9/11, uncertainties regarding 
intentions of terrorist networks, as well as their capabilities to gain access to weapons 
of mass destruction, have become a main concern for the US: “terrorism has long 
been a tactic, but modern technology allows a few small men with outsized rage to 
murder innocents on a horrific scale” (Obama, 2009a: 2). Technological 
advancements aimed at securing nation states against one another, have opened up a 
Pandora’s Box of catastrophic dangers to a given state, posed by non-traditional 
actors: “the world may no longer shudder at the prospect of war between two nuclear 
superpowers” (ibid). The dangers faced today are then arguably increasingly 
characterised by asymmetric conflicts between states and non-state actors, rather 
than more traditional state-state conflicts. 
In order to unfold how ontological objects may be perceived as posing a threat to a 
given society, the epistemological grounding upon which these perceptions and 
logics are built, has to be laid out. Subsequently, this section will take it’s point of 
departure in the aftermath of the 9/11 events, which we can use to proceed to 
understand how the threat of terrorism is constructed. 
!  Aradau & Munster (2011: 31), employs the term conjectural when analysing present 7
constructions of the terrorist threat; they rely on a definition drawn from the Oxford 
English Dictionary, which we employ here in its first sense: “The interpretation of 
signs or omens; … a conclusion as to coming events drawn from signs or omens;” a 
more strict interpretation is the creation of prognoses or forecasts on grounds that 
are not sufficient to create proof. Our point here is that the construction of certainty 
is ultimately based on the constancy of radical uncertainty, whereby the construction 
of prognoses are ultimately based on indications of harmful intent.
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The epistemological foundation, structuring the management of terrorism as a 
threat, is arguably grounded in radical uncertainty. Then US Secretary of Defence 
Donald Rumsfeld articulated this understanding of uncertainty in the most poetic 
manner, at a press conference in Brussels, 2002: 
“The message is that there are no knowns. 
There are things that we know that we know. 
There are known unknowns. 
That is to say there are things that we now know we don't know. 
But there are also unknown unknowns.  
There are things we don't know we don't know.” (Rumsfeld, 2002). 
Rumsfeld touches upon the distinction between the ontological understanding of 
knowledge and the epistemological aspect of how such knowledge is acquired - thus 
interlinking the construction, as well as the governance of the alleged threats in 
question. Knowledge of the world is never complete and all-encompassing. There are 
aspects of reality which the US government is completely unaware of; there are 
aspects which they know; and there are elements, of which the existence the US is 
aware of, despite the nature of these given elements being contested. 
Common for the known knowns and the known unknowns in Rumsfeld’s quote, is 
that there is certainty of their existence. As such they can be found and understood 
despite uncertainties of their given nature. Being knowledgeable we can consider 
such acts as manageable uncertainties, given that they can be tamed through 
different modes of governance (Kessler & Werner, 2008: 294). The unknown 
unknowns are meanwhile understood as those incidents that transcends and move 
beyond established modes of governance. These introduce the idea of ‘radical 
uncertainty’ (Ibid.; Daase and Kessler, 2007: 412; Ewald, 2002: 286). Radical 
uncertainty refers to the idea that some future events are genuinely uncertain in the 
sense that knowledge of them and how they will develop and unfold cannot be 
obtained. Radical uncertainty can hence be considered equivalent to what Aradau & 
Munster define as a catastrophe; an event that is “unexpected, unforeseen, and may 
radically break with the present” (Aradau and Munster, 2011: 6). 
Following Anderson (2010), de Goede (2011) and Aradau & Munster (2007; 2012), 
we argue that as far as an event is understood as having a potential catastrophic 
outcome - entailing radical uncertainties regarding its coming and precise nature - a 
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logic of precaution, pre-emption or preparation   is often introduced as a means for 8
controlling the future. Anderson, also relating to the wider agenda of 
counterterrorism measures, argues that “in relation to terrorism [...] acting in 
advance of the future is an integral, yet taken-for-granted, part of liberal-democratic 
life” (Anderson, 2010: 777). 
Inscribed in the logic of precaution, is a rationale prescribing that “[where] there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing [...] measures to prevent” said threat (Aradau & Munster, 
2007:102). In relation to blacklisting as a precautionary means for combating 
terrorism, Guild argues in the same vein that the “high political value” of such 
measures are “generally used to justify providing them with additional protection 
against judicial examination” (Guild, 2010: 3). As such the construction of a relation 
between the radical uncertainty of the catastrophe and the structured uncertainty 
through which they are managed is made. 
In the following section, we will seek to unfold how a logic of preemption, initiated 
under the Bush administration, was replaced by a logic of precaution when the 
Obama administration took office. 
FACING CATASTROPHE - SECURITY POST-9/11 
Here, we will show how the events of 9/11 manifested themselves as catastrophic 
events characterised by radical uncertainty. We will proceed by arguing that these 
events paved the way for the introduction of a new mode of governance characterised 
by a logic of precaution as a way of structuring uncertainty and preventing the radical 
uncertain from unfolding. 
“With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a new dawn of democracy 
took hold abroad, and a decade of peace and prosperity arrived at 
home. ... Then, on September 11th 2001, we were shaken out of 
complacency. ... This was a different kind of war. No armies came 
to our shores, and our military was not the principal target. 
Instead, a group of terrorists came to kill as many civilians as they 
could.” (Obama, 2013).” 
What the quote above portrays is that there is another hidden dimension to 
Rumsfeld’s poetry of the knowns and unknowns in the US security policy-making of 
!  Precaution, pre-emption and preparation are all modes of action against a future 8
which has been problematised. Precaution acts against an identified threat, 
regardless of scientific uncertainty, and before the threat becomes irreversible. Pre-
emption acts upon emerging threats, as such before these are identified as actual 
threats. Preparedness prescribes action being  taken after the event has happened. 
Rather than seeking to stop or halt a future event from happening, preparedness 
seeks to control or stop the effects and consequences of the event (Anderson, 2010: 
789-791). 
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today: as there are also unknown knowns - those knowns one does not fully 
acknowledge (Daase & Kessler, 2007: 419). For example, terrorism was not an 
unknown threat prior to the 9/11; in fact, the US had experienced several terrorist 
attacks up to that day in 2001  . What distinguished the 9/11 case from other terrorist 9
attacks throughout the 80’s and 90’s however, was the catastrophic scope and depth 
of the event: large numbers of casualties and damages to infrastructure, as well as 
macro-economic consequences   and moral panic  , were brought along with the 10 11
attack. And further distinguishing itself from previous attacks, was the invocation of 
exceptional measures in the aftermath of the 9/11-events: 
”to make certain our nation country never again faced such a day 
of horror, we developed a comprehensive strategy, beginning with 
far greater homeland security to make the United States a harder 
target. But since wars cannot be won on the defensive, we moved 
decisively against the terrorists in their hideouts and sanctuaries, 
and committed to using every asset to take down their 
networks” (Cheney, 2009: 1-2). 
So whereas the damages of previous attacks had been dealt with through law 
enforcement measures, the catastrophic scope of 9/11 resulted in a dislocation of 
these modes of governance and conceptualised the threat of terrorism as one 
preceding outside the sphere of unknown knowns and in the sphere of known 
unknowns. Whilst  the precise capabilities and intentions of the terrorist networks 
were contested, the fact that the threat existed was no longer in question. The 
catastrophic nature of 9/11 can thus be understood as a dislocation, which opened up 
for a rearticulation of the US foreign policy, enabling the construction of new modes 
of governance initiated by the Bush administration. 
The Bush approach to terrorism was largely one of punitive action, on the one hand, 
and preemptive   interventions on the other. Being punitive it was concerned with 12
targeting those directly responsible for the 9/11 attacks. This logic is manifested in 
!  “In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our Embassy in Beirut; at our 9
Marine Barracks in Lebanon; on a cruise ship at sea; at a disco in Berlin; and on Pan 
Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie. In the 1990s, we lost Americans to terrorism at the 
World Trade Center; at our military facilities in Saudi Arabia; and at our Embassy in 
Kenya” (Obama, 2013: 6).
!  For further information on the macro-economic consequences of the 9/11 see eg. 10
Blomberg and Hess’ (2009) estimation of the macroeconomic cost of September 11. 
attacks on the United States economy. 
!  For further information on the concept of moral panic in relation to the 9/11 and 11
the War on Iraq, see eg. Bonn (2010) “Moral Panic and the U.S. War on Iraq”.
!  There has been much scholarly discussion on the distinction between preemption 12
and prevention, which will also come clear in our analysis of international law; 
however, what is central here is that they both operate with the logic of precaution, 
albeit with different time conceptions. As such, the interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan can both be characterised as relying on the logic of precaution.
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The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (AUMF), which was 
passed shortly after 9/11, and granted the President authority to “use all necessary 
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001” (AUMF, 2001). The identity of the terrorist threat was 
accordingly given meaning through the determination of criminal responsibility for 
9/11 constituting a very specific, named group of individuals  . These individuals 13
were targeted by several means, one of them being armed drones. The preemptive 
logic was carried through in the Bush doctrine, when the US called upon their rights 
to intervene in other countries  . This way of acting in order to prevent possible 14
futures did also become prevalent in the use of drone strikes, whose limits were 
widened in 2008. Until then the use of armed drones had been largely restricted to 
very specific, named, high-value targets against whom the strategy was utmost 
efficient (Zenko, 2013a). In 2008, however, Bush incorporated a precautionary 
aspect into his counter -terrorist strategies, as he authorised the practice of so-called 
signature drone strikes against suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Pakistan 
who were not known by name or formal association (Zenko, 2013a:12). As a US 
official pointed out: “We got down to a sort of ‘reasonable man’ standard. If it 
seemed reasonable, you could hit it.” (Zenko, 2012). 
Bush introduced “The Global War on Terror” in order to protect the US against 
future attacks, but we will argue that even though Obama changed the name to 
Overseas Contingency Operations   the logic of precaution has largely prevailed as a 15
central presumption for acting. Rejecting the Global War on Terror and its 
preemptive character of implementing and enforcing democracy Obama have 
repeatedly sought to establish “a new beginning between the United States and 
Muslims around the world”, as well as in the Middle East in general (Obama, 2009c). 
Obama describes the retreat from Iraq as a move away from “a boundless ‘global war 
on terror’ [focusing instead on] a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle 
!  Named killings or high-value-individual strikes relate to the killing of named and 13
identified terrorists as a means for achieving the initial purpose of killing suspected 
al-Qaeda leaders (Zenko, 2013a). Through the use of intelligence sources and 
methods, CIA, and to a lesser degree Pentagon, determine whether the individual is 
considered an imminent threat to the US or has identifiable association to al-Qaida, 
with which they become legal targets under the AUMF within US domestic law.
!  Jervis, 2003: 367; Furthermore, an aim was to bring democracy to unstable regions 14
as a means for developing future peace, not only in Iraq in Afghanistan but the whole 
region as such. Jervis (2003: 367) further argue in this article on the Bush doctrine 
that: “The administration's argument is that strong measures to spread democracy 
are needed and will be efficacious. Liberating Iraq will not only produce democracy 
there, but it will also encourage democracy in the rest of the Middle East” (Jervis, 
2003: 367)
!  This was changed in a memo to Pentagon in 2009 stating “this administration 15
prefers to avoid using the term 'Long War' or 'Global War on Terror' [GWoT.] Please 
use 'Overseas Contingency Operation.” (Wilson & Kamen, 2009)
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specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America” (Obama, 2013:2). 
Turning away from the illegal and illegitimate ‘boots on the ground’-policy (ibid.). 
This attitude is underlined by his earlier Thomas Jefferson reference: "I hope that 
our wisdom will grow with our power, and teach us that the less we use our power 
the greater it will be." (Jefferson in Obama, 2009c). Despite the rejection of 
preventionist measures, as were used in the Iraq war, we will show that the logic of 
precaution, central for the preventive argument, is still inherent in the way the US 
drone program manifests itself. 
From this section, we can conclude that the US’ perception of the world is one 
marked both by certainties and uncertainties. The 9/11 events were perceived as 
catastrophic and radically uncertain and whilst the preventive actions were widely 
criticised for being illegitimate, the Obama administration has proceeded with the 
use of drone strikes, which can be seen also as a measure of precaution. 
TARGETED KILLINGS 
In this section we will show how the contemporary drone program under president 
Obama manifests the precautionary logic in their way of using targeted killings and 
especially signature strikes, as a means for taming and preventing a radical uncertain 
future from unfolding itself. 
A Contested Practice 
Referring to the memoirs of Colin Powell on the Vietnam War, the long time writer 
on US foreign policy, Micah Zenko presents what he deems to be an analogy to the 
contemporary use of targeted killings as part of the drone program of the Obama 
administration: 
"I recall a phrase we used in the field, MAM, for military-age male. 
If a helo spotted a peasant in black pajamas who looked remotely 
suspicious, a possible MAM, the pilot would circle and fire in front 
of him. If he moved, his movement was judged evidence of hostile 
intent, and the next burst was not in front but at him. Brutal? 
Maybe so" (Powell, in Zenko, 2012). 
What is entailed under the term targeted killings is however, highly contested, with 
many different accounts of what action is actually carried out, as well as a general 
concern over the level of secrecy and lack of public accountability (Niva, 2013: 199). 
As such, there is also debate about whether the practice of targeted killings actually 
constitute anything new as suggested above. We will argue that whereas the practice 
of targeted killings might not be entirely new, what is new is the way in which it has 
been institutionalised and thus constitute the most essential part of the Obama 
administration’s security policy, according to Zenko (Zenko, 2012). 
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The UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston produced a report in 2010 on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, in which he defines targeted killings as “the 
intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents 
acting under colour of law, or by an organised armed group in armed conflict, against 
a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.”   Alston 16
notes how the use of drones in targeted killings have caused significant controversy 
regarding several matters. Of great concern is the issue of whether “policy makers 
and commanders will be tempted to interpret the legal limitations on who can be 
killed, and under what circumstances, too expansively” (Ibid.) when not risking the 
life of own forces. As such, Alston questions the certainty of the method in 
determining who can be killed and who cannot, which arguably manifests some of 
the tensions between the UN system and that of the US drone program. 
This concern has also been raised in response to how the Obama administration 
expanded the AUMF and granted presidential authority over means against “those 
persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners” (Johnson, 2012: 3). This change institutionalised the part of the 
drone policy based on signature strikes, inherited from Bush. John Brennan  17
explains in 2012 how “lethal action [is not] about punishing terrorists for past 
crimes; we are not seeking vengeance. Rather, we conduct targeted strikes because 
they are necessary to mitigate an actual ongoing threat, to stop plots, prevent future 
attacks, and to save American lives” (Brennan, 2012). As such, the terrorist threat, 
transformed from being restricted to the specifically named individuals responsible 
for the 9/11, to also include institutionalised precautionary measures to deal with the 
threats of unknown individuals associated with the group of people responsible. 
Distinguishing between and making clear who constitutes a legitimate target, 
arguably makes up one of the most crucial aspects of the drone program. We will 
address this by analysing the methods used for determining what constitutes a 
legitimate target in the US drone program. Doing this we will show how these 
methods and rationales are structured by the knowledge regime relying on the 
precautionary logic in which it is deemed legitimate to act through conjectural 
reasoning and anticipated futures. 
!  UN, A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (2010), “Report of the Special Rapporteur on 16
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston”
!  Then Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and is 17
now director of the Central Intelligence Agency
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TARGETING OF NAMED INDIVIDUALS OR UNKNOWN MILITANTS? 
Closing in on what defines a targeted killing, academic accounts and public media 
often distinguish between two types of targeted killings:   named killings and 18
signature strikes. Despite the fact that signature strikes were already an established 
practice before the Obama administration took office, official statements from the 
Obama administration only describe and talk about personal strikes  , whilst the 19
discussion of signature strikes is prominent in both academia, public media, UN 
accounts, as well as accounts from anonymous officials  . 20
In an effort to be more transparent about the US drone program, Brennan revealed 
that “we only authorize a particular operation against a specific individual if we have 
a high degree of confidence that the individual being targeted is indeed the terrorist 
we are pursuing … Of course, how we identify an individual naturally involves 
intelligence sources and methods, which I will not discuss” (Brennan, 2012). The 
arguments presented here reflect what Zenko argues is at best characterised as a 
‘trust-us’ policy legitimising that the US operate ‘only’ with “high degree[s] of 
confidence” before using lethal force (Zenko, 2013b). Such statements about high 
degrees of confidence have also caused for concern about the named killings and 
whether they actually target high-value individuals or individuals without proper 
identification, leading to high numbers of civilian casualties (Heller, 2013: 119; 
Zenko, 2013b). Reviews by the press of leaked classified documents from the CIA 
show that “at least 265 of up to 482 people who the U.S. intelligence reports 
estimated the CIA killed, during a 12-month period ending in September 2011 were 
not senior al Qaida leaders but instead were ‘assessed’ as Afghan, Pakistani and 
unknown extremists” (Landay, 2013). As such one can arguably question whether the 
method of named killings is not increasingly being replaced by that of signature 
strikes. 
The rationale for the killings of unknown extremists that does not fall under the 
category of named killings can be related to the non-official policy of signature 
!  Officially the US uses the term strikes instead of killings. Due to the 18
widespread use of killings in both academic, public media and UN accounts 
we use this term.
!  The speech by John Brennan from 2010 in which he addresses the “The Ethics and 19
Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy” he is asked about the use of 
signature strikes to which he responds: “You make reference to signature strikes that 
are frequently reported in the press. I was speaking here specifically about targeted 
strikes against individuals who are involved. Everything we do, though, that is carried 
out against al-Qaida is carried out consistent with the rule of law, the authorization 
on the use of military force, and domestic law” (Brennan, 2010). As such Brennan 
does not reject that signature strikes are carried out but focuses only on explaining 
personal strikes.
!  Despite the lack of official accounts about the specific procedures there have been 20
leaks of classified material as well statements by anonymous US officials describing 
the program and use of signature killings/strikes.
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strikes  , terrorist attack disruption strikes or crowd killing as the policy is generally 21
termed (Zenko, 2013a). Trying to define signature strikes, a lot of uncertainty arises 
once again, but most definitions - often based on accounts from anonymous US 
officials - defines the policy as “the targeting of groups of men who bear certain 
signatures, or defining characteristics associated with terrorist activity, but whose 
identities aren’t known”   (Klaidman, 2012: 41). How such association and 22
signatures are made known will now be addressed. 
Despite the high level of secrecy and classification of all documents relating to the 
policy of signature strikes some ideas of how signatures are defined and determined 
are available - some being more informal than others. The New York Times in 2012 
reported how anonymous officials in the State Department were sceptical about the 
signature strike program saying that if “three guys [are] doing jumping jacks, the 
agency thinks it is a terrorist training camp [...] men loading a truck with fertilizer 
could be bomb-makers - but they might also be farmers” (Becker & Shane, 2013). 
Assuming, however, that some rules are established we follow Heller and the UN 
Report   from 2010 describing the method as “pattern of life” analyses (Heller, 23
2013). This method is based on a method in which certain individuals and their 
behaviour is monitored and on behalf of these patterns one can arguably determine 
intentions of the individual (Cloud, 2010; Heller, 2013: 94). An anonymous official 
stated in 2010 how “We might not always have their names, but ... these are people 
whose actions over time have made it obvious that they are a threat” (Cloud, 2010). 
Being very certain about the characteristics of the threat is also a reason for the 
establishment of patterns. Heller has through discussions with anonymous officials, 
leaked reports, etc. established that there are at least 14   characteristics or 24
!  The policy have never been officially recognised and remains classified. Former 21
Director for National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair and Micah Zenko discusses 
this in an interview, where Blair argues that " the recommendation that Micah has 
that what he calls signature strikes should be -- should be halted -- I have to be very 
careful talking about this, of course, because this aspect is still classified, and I'm still 
subject to having to protect classified information". Zenko argues himself: "... this 
gets to the issue of signature strikes, which the Obama administration has never, on 
the record, acknowledged that it conducts". (Masters, 2013).
!  This definition is widely used and figures in accounts from the Council of Foreign 22
Relations (Zenko, 2013a) as well as academic accounts such as Heller, (2013) and we 
find it credible enough to use as general definition. Other definitions describe how 
they determine guilt and association: “people in an area of known terrorist activity, or 
found with a top Qaeda operative, are probably up to no good” (Zenko, 2012).
!  A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (2010), “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 23
summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston”
!  Heller argues that these categories comprise: planning attacks, transporting 24
weapons, handling explosives, Al-Qaeda compounds, Al-Qaeda training camps, 
military-age-male in in areas of known terrorist activity, consorting with known 
militants, armed men travelling in trucks in Al-Qaeda controlled areas, suspicious 
camp activity in Al-Qaeda-controlled areas, groups of men travelling towards conflict, 
operation of Al-Qaeda training camp, training to join Al-Qaeda, facilitators for 
terrorist activities, rest facilities (Heller, 2013: 94-103).
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signatures that are used for creating life pattern analyses in the US drone program. 
The ability to determine such signatures is part of the understanding that the 
surveillance offered by the drones is so precise that it enables the determination of 
future hostile intent. 
As such guilt and potential threat is established on the basis of association and 
behaviour rather than name and other formal   associations to a group. In the case of 25
drone strikes, a logic of precaution thus prevails “in which only a relationship of 
possibility, eventuality, plausibility, or probability between a cause and its effect can 
be envisaged” (Ewald, 2002: 286). We can thus speak of an anticipatory action 
understood as a “process whereby a future becomes cause and justification for some 
form of action in the here and now” (Anderson, 2010: 778). It follows the logic of 
precaution in which an anticipated future is prevented by present action and as such 
the future becomes present and understandable through the method of pattern of life 
analyses. 
Embedded in the logic of precaution lies also conjectural reasoning, where “the 
smallest and most inconsequential details [are linked] to a larger context which 
cannot be directly observed or experienced” (Aradau & Munster, 2011: 31). As a 
means for contextualising how this logic function, we relate it to other areas of 
counterterrorism policies, especially those within the domestic affairs of western 
liberal democracies, where it is also used. As Guild argues (2010: 9–10), with regards 
to blacklisting cases, such knowledge revolve around ‘political imagination’, 
‘supposition and conjecture’ as ways of gathering knowledge and determine 
responsibility  . This involves risk profiling, done on the grounds of large data 26
gatherings by intelligence services, which in its logic functions on the same 
assumptions as pattern of life analyses by structuring actions that in themselves does 
not cause for worry but when collected make up evidence (de Goede, 2011: 500). 
Analysing the security professionals of the JSOC  , Steve Niva links such measures to 27
those of US counterterrorism policy   where they have “achieved a new density and 28
centrality within US military and related agencies, such that it has now become a 
!  Understood here as a signed membership declaration or other types of membership 25
association that is written or in other ways able to be kept and laid down as proof.
!  Analysing European counterterrorism efforts, de Goede (2011), Sullivan & Hayes 26
(2010) and Guild (2010) argue that targeted sanctions and blacklistings are part of a 
larger political shift towards “risk profiling and preemptive security” (Sullivan & 
Hayes, 2010: 94). In their logics these ways of knowing the future are closely related 
to the methods used for signature strikes, by their reliance on precaution.
!  Joint Special Operations Command27
!  Niva further argues that the signature operations of the US produce “proliferating 28
‘grey areas’ in which violence is largely disappeared from media coverage and 
political accountability” (Ibid.)
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primary theatre of contemporary American warfare”   (Niva, 2013: 186). Calculating 29
and imagining possible futures, the methods of profiling, behavioural patterns, etc. 
inscribe a high degree of certainty in handling the radical uncertainty of the threat 
and can largely be equated with the measures taken by the US in their conduct of 
signature strikes. 
When Zenko concludes that signature strikes “in effect counts all military-age males 
in a strike zone as combatants ... unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously 
proving them innocent” (Zenko, 2013a: 12), it relates to the understanding that one 
can legitimately and precisely determine future hostile behaviour by means of 
patterns - not only of past hostilities, but also including patterns only of affiliation. 
Following Heller, we argue that the signature of being a military-age-male in an area 
known as Al-Qaeda territory, as well as the signature of consorting with known 
militants, are conceptualised as association and affiliation in US drone program. 
Being unknown, associated by patterns of behaviour, these measures must logically 
have been constructed prior and from the behavioural patterns of other known, 
hostile individuals from whom they generalise. Such association is deemed legitimate 
knowledge for using lethal force by establishing a possibility of a future hostility 
(Heller, 2013: 115). 
This leads us to discuss whether there is something new in this way of knowing the 
future through the determination of patterns from what happened in the Vietnam 
War. We argue that this practice is not entirely new and we do not challenge the idea 
that signatures of military-age-males and other characteristics have determined 
legitimate targets before. Rather we argue that the way in which this idea - taking 
precautions through knowing the future - is institutionalised and legitimised in a 
manner that makes it rather distinct from what was considered a “breakdown in 
morale, discipline, and professional judgment” during the Vietnam War (Powell in 
Zenko, 2012). These practices of knowing the future through patterns of life analyses 
have become, as Niva (2013) describes, highly institutionalised and considered as 
legitimate modes of both action and knowledge. This is also present in the way in 
which the discussion about civilian deaths are discussed between various actors. The 
US have on several occasions argued that civilian casualties are “exceedingly 
rare” (Brennan, 2012) with accounts from anonymous officials stating that numbers 
range from 0 to 50 (IHRCRC, 2012: 32). The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
(TBIJ) on the other hand reports that from mid 2004 to mid 2012, data indicate that 
!  On the same note Sullivan & Hayes conclude in their report on “Targeted 29
Sanctions, Preemptive Security and Fundamental Rights” that the introduction of 
such measures have provided “the foundation for unprecedented supranational and 
national powers to preemptively target individual terror suspects and 
groups” (Sullivan & Hayes, 2010: 126).
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drone strikes killed between 2,562 and 3,325 people in Pakistan, of whom 474-881 
were civilians, including 176 children (TBIJ in IHRCRC, 2012: 45). This so-called 
numbers game indicates more than just disagreements; it indicates most importantly 
that the type of knowledge distinguishing between non-targetable civilians and 
targetable combatants is inherently different within these two systems. As such it 
does not tell us whether the Obama administration lies or fakes its numbers, but 
rather that the knowledge structuring such calculations are different. The methods 
for knowing the future that are used for structuring signature strikes make up for 
different ways of counting and constituting who may pose a threat. This underlines 
the argument that what can be witnessed now is different from what happened in 
Vietnam, as it is institutionalised and legitimate on a different scale. 
Uncertainty about the threat of terrorism is accordingly structured by the 
construction of systems that are able to determine the future behaviour of 
individuals, by means of analysing patterns of behaviour. This kind of action can be 
characterised as anticipatory action in that the anticipated future becomes 
justification for action in the present. This kind of anticipatory action works with and 
is based on conjectural reasoning in which actions, on their own insignificant, in 
their particular relation becomes evidence despite being radically uncertain and 
incomplete. What we draw from this is thus the nodal points of anticipatory action 
and conjectural reasoning, forming one part of the larger chain of significance of the 
system and performatively conditioning the logic of precaution. 
THREAT 
This chapter will focus on examining the invocation of the “the next terrorist attack”, 
that is, the threat as envisioned by the US. As such we seek to analyse how the threat 
of the terrorist is constructed and how this construction relates to and underpins the 
logic of precaution inherent in the US drone program. We will argue that the threat 
of terrorism is understood as, and characterised by, radical uncertainty, worst case 
scenarios and imminence. We will show how this is manifested in the articulations of 
the threat by key political figures of the Obama administration. 
THE THREAT OF TERRORISM AS RADICAL UNCERTAINTY 
The social reality in which the US drone program now operates is constructed 
through articulations of the terrorist threat as being increasingly diffuse. What 
prevails is a construction of the terrorist threat as being one characterised by 
decentralisation, albeit still maintaining a certain hierarchical organisational 
structure, as al-Qaeda’s headquarter determines the cause, whilst modes of action 
are then taken over by subdivisions. These subdivisions are meanwhile located in 
various different locations, “from Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North 
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Africa” (Obama, 2013: 2), and the terrorist threat is accordingly not only 
decentralised but also transnational. Furthermore, as we recall the previously 
presented quote by Brennan (2012): “there are, after all, literally thousands of 
individuals who are part of al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated forces”, a picture is 
drawn of an increasingly expanding terrorist threat. The discourse within which 
terrorism is structured, hence centres increasingly on the uncertain nature of the 
threat’s organisational structure: agents have multiplied and operates within a de-
territorialised and decentralised structure, creating a highly complex network which 
must be targeted. Despite the various locations in which US drone operations are 
deployed, The Human Rights Institute (HRI) at Columbia Law School determines 
that there is a high degree of ambiguity as to whether the US consider itself being in a 
single war with al-Qaeda or rather as being engaged in multiple armed conflicts 
(HRI, 2011:8-9). Radical uncertainty is however not only determined within the 
threat’s scope and organisational structure, but also within the innovation processes 
regarding strategy making of the terrorist network: “Terrorists continue to adapt to 
conditions and develop more aggressive and effective methods, often incorporating 
multiple simultaneous attacks and suicide bombings” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006: x). 
By attributing an adaptive nature to the terrorist networks, underlining the notion of 
radical uncertainty, terrorism is simultaneously being constructed as a constant 
threat. 
THE NEXT TERRORIST ATTACK 
In this section we will show how the perception of the “next terrorist attack” is being 
constructed as a certainty of almost objective character, which is bound to happen 
unless prevented. The next terrorist attack perception is grounded in a worst case 
scenario logic operating with the belief that terrorists seek to kill as many Americans 
as possible using weapons of mass destruction. Through this worst case scenario 
logic, the terrorist threat is being constructed as one of imminent nature, which in 
retrospect legitimises the use of drone strikes as a precautionary method. 
At a visit to Prague in 2009, President Obama articulated the biggest threat to 
security, which the US faces: “we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear 
weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. One 
terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction” (Obama, 
2009b). He proceeded to explain that: “One nuclear weapon exploded in one city [...] 
could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And [...] there is no end to what the 
consequences might be - for our global safety, our security, our society, our economy, 
to our ultimate survival” (ibid.). The President proceeds to argue that “terrorists are 
determined to buy, build or steal one [nuclear bomb]” (Obama 2009b). Whilst 
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weapon technologies are being developed, they are leaked to the black market, and 
thus the terrorist is once again constructed as a constant threat, as the articulation 
opens up for a never ending relationship of development and adaption between the 
US and the terrorist  . The notion of constancy is also present in more recent 30
accounts by Obama: 
“neither I, nor any President, can promise the total defeat of 
terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some 
human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open 
society” (Obama, 2013: 1). 
Being twofold Obama emphasises how this is a general condition, even for himself: 
“we are fallible. We make mistakes, and fall victim to the temptations of pride, and 
power, and sometimes evil. Even those of us with the best of intentions will at times 
fail to right the wrongs before us” (Obama, 2009a: 7). This underpins the objective 
constancy of the radical uncertainty inherent in the US policy on terrorism under the 
Obama administration: it is the natural occurrence of evil in some that manifest the 
danger of terrorism, and thereby the necessity of action. The notion of being radically 
uncertain, even of one's own actions as Obama portrays it stands in sharp contrast to 
the Bush administration that articulated a strong logic of moral certainty that Obama 
rejects whilst still presenting the necessity to act. 
The 9/11 Commission   determined lack of imagination as being the reason for the 31
failure of the US defence department to foresee and prevent the attacks (9/11 
Commission, 2004: 347). As we established, this event was considered such a 
massive catastrophe that had to entail a rearticulation of US security policy. In order 
to reconstruct reality imagination has, after 9/11, hence come to play a vital part of 
the way in which the threat of terrorism is understood. Aradau & Munster show this 
in their article on the “next terrorist attacks”, when they investigate how contingency 
plans are made by “acting out” future threats; a practice that ultimately “has its basis 
in the imagination of the unthinkable” (Aradau & Munster, 2012: 99). As such 
imaginations of worst case scenarios come to determine action; making the future 
present. 
When Obama now determines nuclear attacks as being the events against which the 
US must protect itself, the current construction of security has (re)integrated the 
vision of catastrophe that dictated the Cold War and thus re-articulates former threat 
!  “the United States must take into account that [...] al-Qa'ida would engage in 30
[disastrous] attacks regularly to the extent it were able to do so” (White Paper, 8)
!  The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was set up 31
in 2002 to prepare an account of the circumstances of the 9/11, as well as formulate 
preparedness for and immediate responds to the attacks. See also note 3.  
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images into the new reality. Immanuel Kant explained, how the “absent past 
becomes present in imagination” (Kant in ‘Aradau and Munster, 2011: 70’): the Cold 
War never resulted in a nuclear war, albeit the vision of catastrophe was constructed, 
and is then incorporated into present construction of threats to underline the 
possibly catastrophic nature of the threat. 
The notion of the next terrorist attack as manifested within both public and official 
discourse have taken the form of an objective truth – an event, which is bound to 
happen, unless prevented. Accordingly, it is constructed as an imminent threat, 
against which precautionary measures are deployed as self-defence. The US takes 
several measures to tame the uncertainties embedded in this worst case scenario 
prophecy. Obama seeks to close the window for terrorists to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction by re-invoking the Cold War mentality, by articulating the desire for a 
new reality without weapons of mass destruction. It is in this articulation of the 
objectiveness of the next terrorist attack the precautionary measures deployed 
through the US drone program is legitimised. By invoking notions of survival, 
security and safety Obama makes this matter one of highest political value for the 
US; a position that arguably legitimises the use of extraordinary means as seen in the 
use of signature strikes. 
Given the determination of future hostility, the question regarding whether another 
terror attack is even probable becomes of lesser importance. What is questioned, is 
instead when and where the next terrorist attack will occur. The notion of ‘the next 
terrorist attack’ has in this manner become a structuring logic of both public and 
official discourse rendering itself as an objective truth. Rather than acknowledging 
terrorism as lying somewhere in-between what is probable and what is possible the 
realisation of another terrorist attack is understood as a certain fact, unless it is 
prevented. If not prevented, it is imagined and constructed as one of worst case 
scenarios integrating earlier imaginations of catastrophes such as 9/11 as well as the 
possibility of a nuclear attack. The nodal points established as a chain of signification 
in regards to threat, is on the one hand, the notion of the next terrorist attack as a 
worst-case scenario and the imminent nature of the threat. At the same time, the 
threat is linked to a notion of the threat as constant. 
RESPONSIBILITY 
In this section we seek to unfold how the radical uncertainty of the terrorist threat is 
managed by constructing certainty about the responsibility for wrongdoing. We 
argue that this move is legitimised by the construction of responsibility tied to a 
specific group of individuals from whom signatures or characteristics can be 
generalised and transferred to other (un)known individuals. Certainty and signatures 
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thus serve as the nodal points for this section, establishing the chain of signification 
related to responsibility. Contrasting this certainty, we argue that the way imminent 
threat is defined by the US, logically opposes the certainty with which responsibility 
is prescribed to individuals through signatures. This underpins that the element of 
radical uncertainty also prevails in the aspect of responsibility. 
With terrorism understood as embedded with uncertainties, another reading of US 
officials’ statements bear witness of how these uncertainties are controlled by the 
establishment of certain, specific and individual responsibility. This is seen in the 
political articulations where US officials tend to follow up their arguments about the 
threat being decentralised and diffuse, with specifically highlighting the locations in 
which the threat is present; “Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, Iraq and Iran. To varying 
degrees, these groups coordinate their activities and follow the direction of AQ 
leaders in Pakistan.” (Olsen, 2012: 2). John Brennan specifying the threat, by 
focusing almost exclusively on al-Qaida instead of terrorism as such, manifests one 
of the ways in which certainty about the threat is constructed. Al-Qaeda is here 
described as a cancer, persisting throughout the world, that have already 
“metastasized in so many different places, and when that metastasized tumor 
becomes lethal and malignant, that’s when we’re going to take the action that we 
need to” (Brennan, 2012). The metaphors of embodiment relates to how patterns of 
life analyses are constructed and thus manifests the certainty with which 
responsibility is ascribed to individuals despite not knowing their named identity. 
The signatures of the very small group of al-Qaeda leaders, about which knowledge is 
considered to be very certain and concrete, are thus generalised and considered 
legitimate for striking against other unknown individuals who show the same 
patterns. 
Having established that the methods used for determining guilt and responsibility 
relies on the evaluation of patterns that can determine future anticipated actions we 
find it important to also address the last procedure that ultimately determines 
whether a strike is conducted or not - the determination of imminence or when the 
tumor is considered lethal and malignant. Explaining their understanding of 
imminent threat the US arguably introduces radical uncertainty once again: 
“what constitutes an imminent threat will develop to meet new 
circumstances and new threats [...] it must be right that states are 
allowed to act in self-defence in circumstances where there is 
evidence of further imminent attacks by terrorist groups, even if 
there is no specific evidence of where such an attack will take place 
or of the precise nature of the attack.” (White Paper: 7). 
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First it is made clear that the understanding of imminence will develop and adapt to 
the specific circumstances of the threat. Here we thus have an anticipation of a 
developing notion of imminence which is based on an anticipation of a developing 
threat that, as we have established, is also anticipated and determined through 
different modes of knowing the future. Second, what constitutes evidence for further 
imminent attacks is made up of the above outlined anticipated threats as well as the 
institutionalisation of the threat by al-Qaeda in the AUMF. This evidence is 
considered legitimate basis for acting in self-defence, despite not knowing how or 
when the attack precisely will take place. This definition of imminent threat thus 
relies heavily on an anticipated future about which evidence can legitimately be 
constructed by generalising patterns of life from separate unidentified individuals. 
The establishment of constantly being under attack is also present in the elaborations 
on the above definition of imminent threat; here it is established how, “with respect 
to al-Qa'ida leaders who are continually planning attacks, the United States is likely 
to have only a limited window of opportunity” (White Paper: 7). It is also clear that it 
is not only the leaders of al-Qaeda that are put under this constant prescription of 
responsibility and intent as it is described further in the white paper  . Also 32
associated forces “demands a broader concept of imminence” (Ibid.: 8). 
CERTAINTY AND SIGNATURES 
Describing why such a broader concept is needed it relies on the notion of the need to 
act in the window of opportunity as the consequences have to be understood as worst 
case scenarios  . The definition of the imminent threat in relation to the use of force 33
against individuals, we argue, is characterised by radical uncertainty and reveals how 
the structuring of that uncertainty through pattern of life analyses also ultimately 
rests on and is conditioned by the radical uncertainty. This is made even clearer in 
the concluding line on the definition of the imminent threat in the white paper: “the 
U.S, government may not be aware of all al-Qaeda plots as they are developing and 
thus cannot be confident that none is about to occur; and that, in light of these 
predicates, the nation may have a limited window of opportunity within which to 
strike in a manner that both has a high likelihood of success and reduces the 
probability of American casualties” (White Paper: 8). It is manifested almost 
explicitly how the threat from terrorism is of such radical uncertainty that the US 
!  “the United States must take into account that certain members of al- Qa'ida 32
(including any potential target of lethal force) are continually plotting attacks against 
the United States; that al-Qa'ida would engage in such attacks regularly to the extent 
it were able to do so” (White Paper, 8)
!  It is arguably manifested here that the window of opportunity must be used due to 33
the imagination of worst case scenarios: “In this context, imminence must 
incorporate considerations of the relevant window of opportunity, the possibility of 
reducing collateral damage to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future 
disastrous attacks on Americans” (White Paper, 8)
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“cannot be confident" that no attack is about to occur (Ibid.). In this way the threat 
becomes constant by necessitating the very anticipation of it. As former CIA analyst 
and current counter-terrorist official Bruce Riedel stated “The problem with the 
drone is it’s like your lawn mower […] You’ve got to mow the lawn all the time. The 
minute you stop mowing, the grass is going to grow back.” (Miller, 2012). The 
legalisation of action thus ultimately rests on the understanding of the anticipated 
threat as radically uncertain with catastrophic consequences. 
In ascribing responsibility with individuals associated with al-Qaeda or associated 
forces, we see an articulation of certainty regarding the legitimacy of identifying 
hostile intent, based on patterns of behaviour. This certainty, we argue, is 
conditioned by the radical uncertainty, which prevails in the determination of what 
constitutes an imminent threat. Consequently, the imminent threat is widened and 
thus excludes the need for clear evidence of the nature of the threat, instead basing 
such upon anticipated worst case scenarios. From this, we confirm that the nodal 
points of certainty and signatures form a chain of signification. 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
In the following chapter, we will argue that the precautionary measures taken against 
the next terrorist attack, constituted as an imminent threat, introduces a prevailing 
constancy, which set aside issues of transparency and invokes instead a strong 
connection between security and secrecy. By examining this relation we are able to 
unfold a hierarchy of norms, in which security takes precedence. Thus, the nodal 
points shaping the chain of signification is here the equalisation between security 
and secrecy bound to the constancy of threats. 
The objectification of the next catastrophic terrorist attack have contributed to the 
construction of the terrorist threat as being one of a constant and imminent nature, 
leading to precautionary measures to be legitimately applied under the right of self-
defence and security: “the U.S. is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the 
Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use 
force consistent with its inherent right to self-defence under international law.” (Koh, 
2010:7). As seen in the leaked White Paper on the lawfulness of targeted killings this 
condition has become rather institutionalised within the Obama administration 
anticipating the next incident, and thereby contributes to drawing out the war: “a 
terrorism war [...] is a drawn out, patient, sporadic pattern of attacks. It is also very 
difficult to know when or where the next incident will occur” (White Paper: 7). This 
understanding of the terrorism war thus makes it clear that “the exception has really 
become the rule – a situation whereby a provisional and exceptional measure has 
been transformed into a durable technique of government” as the anticipation of the 
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next terrorist attack and the following precautionary methods has indeed been 
institutionalised in a way that forms action and governance (de Goede, 2011: 510). 
NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE THREAT 
Whilst the existence of the threat as well as its possible outcome is articulated as one 
of certainty, radical uncertainty still prevails in determining the scope and nature of 
the threat. Whilst the Obama administration has increased presidential authority 
over use of military force to include targeting associated forces to al-Qaeda, the 
geographical size of the actual counter terrorism operations expands with the same 
speed as the terrorist threats decentralise and cross borders. Affiliates of terrorist 
networks are determined to reside in several different locations counting Yemen, 
Somalia, Nigeria, Iraq and Iran, however the US’ limited articulations leave 
questions of whether “the U.S. is engaged in a single or multiple non-international 
armed conflicts, and whether the Administration considers the conflict or conflicts 
geographically circumscribed” (HRI, 2011:8). 
The decentralisation and geographical expansion of al-Qaeda has left for the threat to 
be constructed as of an adaptive nature, which leads for the US to create a constant 
responsibility which they prescribe to alleged terrorists. Structuring uncertainty 
through the determination of terrorist hot zones, results in a constant notion of the 
threat with responsibility prescribed to individuals based on their locations and 
behaviour: “[Signature strikes] in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone 
as combatants ... unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them 
innocent.” (Zenko, 2013a: 12). Accountability is however contested, inasmuch as 
whilst stating that all targets must represent an imminent threat to the US, the 
Obama administration simultaneously “takes the legal position that targeted killings 
do not require ‘a separate self-defence analysis each time”, according to Zenko 
(2013:16). Playing on the notion of ‘innocent until proven otherwise’, Mohammed 
Hanif argues, that the US drone programme is built upon a ‘guilty until proven dead’ 
rationale (Hanif et al, 2011). 
Strikes authorised before a specific examination of guilt/innocence has been been 
undertaken opens up for questions regarding due process. Brennan ranks three 
scenarios in which the rule of due process can be succumbed: 
“These terrorists are skilled at seeking remote, inhospitable terrain 
- places where the United States and our partners simply do not 
have the ability to arrest or capture them. At other times, our 
forces might have the ability to attempt capture, but only by 
putting the lives of our personnel at too great a risk” (Brennan, 
2012: 11). 
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The actual drone strikes accordingly constitute a rule of exception, albeit given 
Obama’s preference for drone strikes as a precautionary tool against the terrorist 
threat, it has rather transformed into being a constant rule of exception, and one 
constructed in accordance to the superior notion of security to US citizens first as 
well as the attribution of constant responsibility to alleged terrorist. Sauer and 
Schörnig argue that in the US counter terrorist operations “casualty avoidance 
among military forces has become a mission goal in itself” (2012: 367), meaning that 
the avoidance of troops on the ground takes precedence over the rule of due process 
and avoiding civilian casualties. 
Action against an individual is legitimized despite radical uncertainty regarding the 
attribution of guilt, which prevails in the following three examples deduced from 
speeches by Obama and Brennan: “we are choosing the course of action least likely 
to result in the loss of innocent life” (Obama, 2013: 3, emphasis added); “before any 
strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or 
injured” (ibid, emphasis added); “we only authorize a particular operation against a 
specific individual if we have a high degree of confidence that the individual being 
targeted is indeed the terrorist we are pursuing” (Brennan, 2012:13, emphasis 
added). Together these notions of least likeliness, near-certainty and high degrees of 
confidence constitute what Obama deems: “the highest standard we can 
set” (Obama, 2013: 3). Despite the Obama administration's “claims that each 
legitimate target must pose ‘an imminent threat of violent attack against the United 
States’” (Brennan in Zenko, 2013a:27), conjectural reasoning persists in the highest 
standards set by the administration. 
OVERSIGHT AND TRANSPARENCY 
Whilst security has taken precedence over legislative authority and due processes, we 
will now proceed to outline the processes of transparency and oversight which 
targeted killings are subjected to. These processes are undeniably made complicated 
by the fact that drone strikes are carried out by two separate entities; the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), which 
have different sets of authorities, policies, accountability mechanisms, and oversight 
(Zenko, 2013c). 
CIA Operations 
Oversight of the CIA  is governed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to which the CIA allegedly 
submit notifications after each strike, determining the nature of the operation. The 
efficiency of congressional intelligence oversight has however been subject to much 
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criticism, especially as much information is passed on only to the ‘Gang of Eight’  34
(HRI, 2011b: 60). Whilst the intelligence committees can question the results of 
authorised drone strikes, the report on the civilian impact of drones, published by 
the HRI however argue that there is little political incentive for the committees to 
pass on information to the public that may contradict the general perception of the 
efficiency of drone strikes to combat terrorism. As such the intelligence committees 
are increasingly protecting the CIA for public scrutiny meaning that the CIA in 
retrospect does not find it problematic to pass on information to the committees 
given the mutual preference for secrecy (HRI, 2011: 60-62). The strikes conducted by 
the CIA are furthermore classified as covert actions, which means that the 
government cannot legally pass on information regarding the drone strikes to the 
public (Zenko, 2013c). A general lack of public articulations thus prevails and as such 
citizens are reliant upon the committees to ensure the CIA adheres to rules of 
conduct. 
JSOC Operations 
The JSOC is a military organisation that falls under the Department of Defence, and 
as such subjected to a public available military doctrine which means that it in 
contrast to the CIA authorised operations are acknowledged by the government 
(Zenko, 2013c). Despite being a subunit to the Department of Defence, the JSOC 
stands out, as it to a high degree is protected from public scrutiny (HRI, 2011b:51). 
This is firstly due to a complex and confusing official description of the organisation, 
which includes no mentioning of drone operations. Furthermore it is argued that the 
“JSOC ‘camouflages itself with cover names, black budget mechanisms, and 
bureaucratic parlor tricks’ to maintain its secrecy” (HRI, 2011b:62). How and to what 
extent the JSOC are subjected to conventional military forces’ commands and rules 
of engagement is contested, albeit according to the HRI report “there are indications 
that JSOC operates independently of the conventional military forces’ geographic 
combatant commands and that it has its own rules of engagement (HRI, 2011b:62). 
Moreover the JSOC is compelled to submit quarterly reports to the armed services 
committees, which duty is to ensure the operations are in compliance to the law, 
albeit as the foreign relations committee has repeatedly been denied access to 
briefings on drone strikes, there appears to be no congressional body that ensures 
that the operations are in line with overall strategic objectives and adhere also to 
diplomatic objectives (Zenko, 2013c). 
!  “The Gang of Eight procedure allows notification of covert actions to be limited to 34
‘chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence 
committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, the 
majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or members of 
the congressional leadership as may be included by the President’” (HRI, 2011:60). 
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What furthermore seems to complicate matters is that JSOC’s drones strikes are 
from time to time conducted under CIA authority, meaning that whilst it is possible 
the operations fall under military rules and procedure, it is also possible that the 
operations are governed by CIA rules and thus perceived as covert operations (HRI, 
2011:62). Furthermore there appear to be no cooperation between the different 
committees to whom the CIA and the JSOC programs report back to, meaning that 
no committee will have the full picture of a joint CIA-JSOC operation (HRI, 2011b:
65). 
A picture of questionable oversight over drone operations thus prevail, regardless of 
whether we speak of drones launched by the CIA or the JSOC. Despite 26 members 
of congress having called upon Obama to ensure more transparency and oversight 
over targeted killings,   and Obama having equally uttered a wish for improved 35
oversight over drone operations (Obama, 2013:3), Zenko (2013b) argues that 
“[s]plitting the drone program between the JSOC and CIA is apparently intended to 
allow the plausible deniability of CIA strikes”, indicating an actual interest for 
transparency and accountability to be avoided through bureaucratic loopholes. 
Public Transparency 
As the vast majority of drone strikes are continuously launched by the CIA, drone 
strike strategies are shrouded in great secrecy, which Brennan justifies by stating “at 
times, our national security demands secrecy” (Brennan, 2012: 15). However 
Brennan continues to argue, that the counter terrorist tools deployed by the US “are 
stronger and more sustainable when the American people understand and support 
them” (Ibid) as far as the information passed on does not jeopardise the success of 
counter terrorist missions. The exception of secrecy is accordingly not constructed 
without relation to the rule of transparency; rather it confirms the rule in its 
exceptional suspension (Mills, 2008:62). A hierarchy accordingly prevails in which 
security is ranked higher than transparency, and can thus in times of imminent 
threat legitimately introduce secrecy. 
This we find present in articulations by e.g. Brennan and Hillary Clinton   invoking 36
the need for secrecy if security is to be upheld. Brennan argues that: “there are some 
!  In the letter the members of congress voiced their concern that “This new authority 35
[signature strikes] is in stark contrast to what your administration has previously 
claimed regarding its drone campaign”. Furthermore the letter continued to specify 
“Our drone campaigns already have virtually no transparency, accountability or 
oversight.“ (Kucinich, 2012)
!  Hillary Clinton, being questioned about the drone program, responded “I’m not 36
going to comment on any intelligence matter. That would not be appropriate. But I 
can assure you that the Obama Administration will not enter into any agreement that 
would be to the detriment of the national security of our country. I think this 
President has demonstrated conclusively that he’s ready to take the tough decisions 
when America’s security is at stake.” (Dougherty, 2012).
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lines we simply will not and cannot cross because, at times, our national security 
demands secrecy. But we are a democracy. The people are sovereign. And our 
counterterrorism tools do not exist in a vacuum. They are stronger and more 
sustainable when the American people understand and support them” (Brennan, 
2012). At first hand this seems rather ambiguous as he is both invoking the need for 
secrecy as well as that of transparency. When going through the speech it does 
however, become clear that every time he comes close to talking about methods and 
mechanisms for ensuring transparency he resorts to making guarantees or what 
Zenko deems the ‘trust us’ policy (Zenko in Masters, 2013): “You make reference to 
signature strikes that are frequently reported in the press. I was speaking here 
specifically about targeted strikes against individuals who are involved. Everything 
we do, though, that is carried out against al-Qaida is carried out consistent with the 
rule of law, the authorisation on the use of military force, and domestic law” (Ibid.). 
In short he is invoking transparency by saying: yes, we follow the law - but we cannot 
show you. It is imperative that the public understand the need for secrecy in security 
measures, not the measures themselves. 
Obama (and his administration), is resided simultaneously inside and outside the 
juridical order, as he both “creates and guarantees the situation that the law needs 
for its own validity” (Mills, 2008: 61) and which is enshrined in the "legislative 
authorisation for the use of U.S. military force" (AUMF) to the president. 
In this section we have shown how, in the Obama administration’s counter terrorism 
programs, security has taken precedence over previously existing rules of legislative 
authority, due process and public transparency. The drone operations are launched 
by two organisations which are largely built on an apparent need for secrecy made 
constant by once again invoking the radical uncertainty and catastrophic nature of 
the threat. What we find is that security is largely equated with secrecy which 
ultimately limits accountability to that of trust and guarantees, and are conditioned 
by the constancy of the threat, altogether establishing a chain of signification. 
!
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CONCLUSION ON US DRONE PROGRAM 
In this chapter we have established chains of signification, which can be seen in 
figure 1.1. The chains of signification are co-constitutively constructed by their nodal 
points, ultimately participating in the structuring of the whole system - construction 
the logic of precaution, conditioning legitimate use of force under the US drone 
program. The central point drawn from our analysis of the US drone program is the 
structuring precedence of the nodal point of radical uncertainty. This is manifested 
in the articulations of the terrorist threat, responsibility and accountability - 
ultimately expressing what is considered legitimate use of force. The logic emanating 
from this system of meaning, is the logic of precaution, which has been accessed 
through our analyses of the radical uncertainty. 
We find that radical uncertainty is present as a structuring condition, constantly 
present in the articulation of the threat of terrorism. This condition is both 
structuring and structured by the anticipation of a catastrophe, which is then invoked 
Fig. 1.1: Legitimate use of force in US drone policy
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as a need for determining future behaviour. The presumption of radical uncertainty 
as an objective, ever present reality is manifested by the construction and 
articulation of the next terrorist attack, worst case scenarios and constant 
imminence. The use of conjectural reasoning, patterns of behaviour and anticipatory 
action prevalent in the policy of signature strikes, are used as methods for taming the 
radical uncertainty. This leads us to argue that what characterises the US drone 
program is a logic of precaution in which it becomes legitimate to use lethal force in 
order to respond to constant threats without knowing their precise nature. 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INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In the former chapter we outlined how the US drone program’s understanding of the 
legitimate use of force is structured upon a logic of precaution, in which anticipated 
future actions are acted upon, despite radical uncertainty being the premise for this 
action. 
In this chapter we analyse which chains of signification are central for understanding 
what constitutes legitimate use of force under international law. We will argue that 
the international legal project is embedded in an empiricist-based logic of reaction, 
which will prove to be persistent throughout the system. We proceed in four steps: 
First, we outline the mode of knowledge inherent in international law, namely the 
reliance on positively defined laws, which can be applied in order to establish 
legality. The reliance on pre-existing legal policies and the application of these onto 
past and present events, establishes a logic of reaction within international law. The 
following sections serve to show how this logic of reaction is manifested in the 
articulations of threats, responsibility and accountability. 
In the second section we outline what constitutes threats under international law, 
ultimately defining what constitutes a threat which can be legitimately acted upon 
with force. We go through both the frameworks of International Human Rights Law 
(IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), in order to establish legitimate 
use of force under both law enforcement and the laws of war. We will show how 
both frameworks rely on a logic of reaction when establishing legality of force 
application. 
Third, we show how the attribution of responsibility to both states and individuals 
under international law is reliant on the establishment of well-defined categories 
such as of civilian and combatant, and further, how positive and well-defined 
evidence is essential to apply this responsibility, subsequently underpinning the logic 
of reaction. 
Last, we shortly outline the issue of accountability under international law, and argue 
that it is based on compliance with legal frameworks, and rely on the availability of 
information and reporting from states to international institutions. 
In the conclusions on each section of this chapter we will relate our findings to those 
of the analysis on the US drone program and briefly evaluate their differences. 
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KNOWLEDGE 
Below, we will show how international law, as a ‘scientific’ knowledge regime 
conceiving of reality as consisting of essentially recursive patterns, structures and 
regulates the uncertainties through the application of pre-existing, positively defined 
policies. The pattern of regulation is then based on a logic of reaction rather than an 
envision, as reality is always accessible and knowable - and therefore asks to be 
judged before treated. 
We will show that the social reality on which international law establishes itself, has 
a well-defined and knowable character, subsequently shaping the knowledge 
assessment of international law in positivist, scientific and conservative terms. 
Lastly, we will argue that this amounts to the construction of a knowledge regime of 
international law based upon a logic of reaction manifested in the reliance on pre-
existing legal vocabularies. Concluding, the chain of signification is co-constitutively 
established by the nodal points of positive and customary law - the empirical 
manifestations of these vocabularies, underpinning the logic of reaction. 
ASSESSING KNOWLEDGE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
“There is knowledge (or non-knowledge) about things, and 
knowledge (or non-knowledge) about ways to identify things…  37
We might or might not know methods of gaining knowledge. If we 
do know ways of escaping non-knowledge, we possess 
methodological knowledge” (Daase and Kessler, 2007: 413). 
The possibility of assessing and knowing reality, is vital to the basic self-image of 
international law. In its aim of regulating and bringing about order, international law 
entails an inherent search for the truth about the ‘malfunctioning’ of society 
(Rasulov, 2004). Regulating and establishing remedies for a malfunctioning society 
through written law, international law inevitably also establishes, defines and 
delimits the reality it is to treat. 
The ontological reality, which international law is to regulate, is closely intertwined 
with the creation of the sovereign nation state. The law of nations emerged only after 
the sovereign state came into being, and as the invention of the sovereign state is 
based upon a European constellation, the grounding logics and knowledge 
construction behind international law are shortly put; essentially European (Lesaffer, 
2007: 31). As such, the ontological grounding for which empirical knowledge or 
‘things’ that can be perceived dangerous or threatening to security - and therefore 
should be regulated by international law - is structured through Westphalian logics. 
!  “...The first refers to the phenomena of reality as such, which we might or might not 37
know, thus having phenomenological or factual knowledge or not. The second refers 
to the epistemological status of such knowledge.” (ibid.)
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(Hostile) Actors are primarily states  . And following this assumption, other 38
dangerous and hostile objects are military capabilities of states, and any intent or 
motivation working against the sovereign state in question. Within traditional 
security logics,   factual knowledge of security dangers faced by states can be close to 39
complete depending on the complete knowledge of these three ‘things’ of actor, 
capability and intent (Daase and Kessler, 2007: 414). The state system in 
international law is underpinned in its deliberations on legitimate uses of force; the 
distinction between international armed conflicts and non-international armed 
conflicts, often seen as a distinction between state-state and state-insurgent armed 
conflicts, underline its structure of sovereign states and objective, prioritised threats 
and dangers. 
This is not to exclude the existence of uncertainty in international politics, though. 
Both to Machiavelli and Hobbes, uncertainty was always defining to politics. 
However, such uncertainty is based on an ‘essential’ rather than accidental 
understanding of politics (ibid.: 415). Theories such as the security dilemma reflect a 
predictable, quantifiable and modern understanding of uncertainty, which can be 
assessed and known through the idea of an essential nature of reality. 
Determining how complete knowledge may be obtainable, reliable and known, is 
methodological knowledge or epistemology. Two ways of accessing knowledge, both 
of which are connected to modern thought and European logics, have in particular 
structured and determined the legitimate techniques for obtaining knowledge that 
may assess danger in international law (Daase and Kessler, 2007: 414). These are 
arguably based on either calculations of relative frequency or degree of belief. 
The first, knowledge of relative frequency, can be understood as characterising 
uncertainty as “a distinct and exhaustive set of possible states of the world and a 
probability distribution over this set” (Daase and Kessler, 2007: 148). It provides a 
form of secured empiricist-based knowledge about possible states of the world. When 
regarding norms for the use of force in international law, this form of knowledge 
attainment results in a form of management, which is realised by prioritising 
questions of legality and legitimacy evolving around “which norm to apply, what 
evidence to take into considerations, and how to allocate responsibility and 
guilt” (Kessler and Werner, 2008: 294). From this, the legal vocabulary of norms can 
be conceptualised as a specific kind of management, governance or ‘mode’ that 
!  See the UN Charter, Chapter I and II. Here it is implied that membership in the 38
laws of nations are only obtained through sovereign statehood, and that this 
constellation is unbreachable once obtained.
!  We are aware that human and societal security are also important, but choose to 39
focus on traditionally defined national and international security logics.
!46
applies when uncertainty is given in a manner that comply with the established 
structure of the legal vocabulary. 
When an uncertainty does not comply with, or cannot be absorbed by already-
established vocabulary and policies of probability, another kind of assessing 
knowledge and certainty, is through the idea of belief. This does not define ontology 
according to frequency, but rather ”probability does not constitute knowledge of the 
world; rather, it constitutes knowledge about our engagement with the world and 
includes qualitative judgements about ‘what is the case’.” (Daase and Kessler, 2007: 
147). 
Underpinning both these logics, are the international law judgements of the ICJ. In 
the ICJ Statute, the Hierarchy of Material   , which indicates the hierarchy of legal 40
materials upon which the court conducts a ruling, demonstrates first how 
international conventions - or positive law - takes precedence in rulings. Here, these 
define the possible states of the world and absorbs uncertainty into pre-existing 
conventions and policies of positive law, subsequently shaping, regulating and 
absorbing the future and its uncertainties into existing structures of the present and 
the past. Second and third as deciding for court rulings, are equally materials, such 
as customary law, relating to already established, accepted and recognised practices 
of states - opinio juris - hence contributing to rulings of the Court being inherently 
conservative and occupied with defining and treating an ontology of recursive 
patterns, when possible. 
It may not however, always be possible to apply pre-existing policies or laws only in 
the face of new danger or uncertainty. The Court also represents a more open-ended 
form of jurisdiction, which is vital to its continual legitimacy. The ICJ can absorb 
uncertainty appearing outside of established knowledge of and procedures through 
the collection of evidences or processes of trial into manageable uncertainty. By 
conveying judgements, the ICJ then secures uncertain situations as established 
knowledge. These judgements serve to expand the possible set of states of the world 
by establishing a knowledge of analogy, conveying lessons of the past into the future 
as ahistorical and generally applying (Burgis, 2009: 265). And as theorised by 
Luhmann (1991: 72), this implies that risk and norms may be understood as 
integrating and connecting the future into the present. 
!  Article 38 in the Statute of the Court of ICJ (hereinafter ICJ Statute), “1. The Court, 40
whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. 
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations ; d. subject to the provisions of 
Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists 
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”
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Whether in one or the other of the two above, it is assumed that laws can structure 
and treat a well-defined (essential) ontology, as this is based upon the existence of 
recursive patterns and regularities of threats and risks. Laws then serve a philosophy 
of instrumental rationalism, which came to prevail in the international sphere with 
the rise of positivism and a positivist legal theory in the 19th century. Giving leeway 
for rationality to supersede morality and ethics as virtue in the legal system, but still 
connected to ancient rationales   of the rule of law, the modern international law 41
paradigm reinforces the logic that the legal system need to exist as a distinct sphere 
of rationalised, ‘scientific’ action apart from decisions and deliberations of power and 
politics in order to prevent any actions of passion, irrationality and arbitrariness 
from affecting purely legal consideration. The structuring of legal spaces of 
international law then defines law and the justifiable outcomes of this as resting on 
means rather than ends; “fairness in the application of the law ... legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency." (S/2004/616). 
Heroic ideas of rehabilitation and redemption as regulatory moral duties of law are 
then discarded from international law, which does not punish or regulate interstate 
relations by means of power, but only proceeds on positive rationality (Coker, 2004). 
In order to establish complete knowledge, law is then necessarily quarantined from 
the indeterminacy and ambiguity of politics and power (Burgis, 2009: 264). 
Occupied with the task of accurately determining conditions of social reality, the 
international legal project assumes an objective and well-defined ontology, which 
can and has to be known in order for the international legal project to treat and cure 
it according to its aim: “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”  . If 42
normative judgements proceed on a case by case-basis, laws of the international legal 
project are operationalised by being clear - not retrospective - and consistent and 
general in their application, making predictable expectations widely understood and 
well-established procedures possible (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert, 2012: 19). 
ESTABLISHING A LOGIC OF REACTION 
From the above, it can be deduced that the international legal vocabulary of 
conventions and norms on the use of force would apply as a specific mode of 
governance. The production of knowledge in international law then takes on a 
certain form of probability, treating uncertainty as essentially knowable through the 
present legal vocabulary as enshrined in positive law. The development of a situation 
!  Aristotle said more than two thousand years ago, "The rule of law is better than that 41
of any individual." - often interpreted as the only way to protect individuals from the 
arbitrary exercise of power is to subject all individuals within the state to the ultimate 
authority of law (UN Rule of Law).
!  Charter of the United Nations, Preamble42
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is both connected to and limited by these articulated logical expectations - an 
ambiguity can arise within the confines of a given legal situation only, or it has to be 
absorbed into the legal vocabulary through legal rulings and opinions in order not to 
threaten it. Uncertainty is then always structured; based upon consideration bound 
by the logics of the situation only. 
The logics structuring action and legitimate knowledge within international law, we 
will argue in the forthcoming, can beneficially be characterised through a logic of 
reaction. If the international legal project’s inherent assumption is that it regulates, 
cures, judges and essentially; remedies the symptoms of a malfunctioning society, 
facts need to be established before judgements (or remedies and medicine) are 
pronounced. This we will argue, reveals the fundamental basis of the knowledge 
regime of international law as essentially based upon a logic of reaction. 
And also regarding what constitutes the legitimate use of force within this knowledge 
regime is, in every instance of the legal project, based upon an inherent logic of 
reaction structuring the use of force on a well-defined reality; thus absorbing 
uncertainty in a defining process of reacting to present and past events or actions. 
It is in the application of pre-existing norms and legal policies that the knowledge 
paradigm of international law hinges on a logic of reaction; in order to evaluate use 
of force as legitimate, it evaluates the action through established norms and 
categories. As the ICJ stated in the Nuclear Weapons Case, it is within the purview of 
the Court to apply the legal rules relevant to present cases, and not to undertake 
speculations or hypothesization on future, possible events.   43
Uncertainty then takes the form as structured uncertainty, through pre-existing legal 
vocabularies. It demonstrates a fundamental logic of reaction underlying the specific 
kind of regulation international law conducts: herein threats and uncertainties are 
managed by being absorbed and structured into already existing articulated and 
codified international law, which subsequently only manages future through the 
lessons of the past. Thus, the nodal points establishing the chain of signification is 
customary and positive law, structured by the pre-existing legal vocabularies. If this 
is not possible, uncertainty is structured and integrated into the international legal 
project through the collection and establishment of facts, which contribute to new 
!  ICJ: “Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion)” (hereinafter Nuclear 43
Weapons Case), para. 15, considering jurisdiction: “Certain States have however 
expressed the fear that the abstract nature of the question might lead the Court to 
make hypothetical or speculative declarations outside the scope of its judicial 
function. The Court does not consider that, in giving an advisory opinion in the 
present case, it would necessarily have to write "scenarios", to study various types of 
nuclear weapons and to evaluate highly complex and controversial technological, 
strategic and scientific information. The Court will simply address the issues arising 
in all their aspects by applying the legal rules relevant to the situation.”
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‘lessons’ being integrated into the legal project. The future and its uncertainties is 
then absorbed into and structured by the conditions possible in the present only, 
making them certain. Every action taken becomes a reaction to, and enforcement of, 
past events. 
Opposed to this conception of knowledge is the anticipatory action found in the US 
drone program. Here, the anticipation of a future catastrophic event becomes the 
determinant for actions in the here and now. This is determined by the collection and 
construction of patterns that are generalised and applied to other unknown 
individuals. As such, the understanding of legitimate knowledge for determining the 
use of force is for the US conditioned by radical uncertainty, whilst the logic of 
reaction in international law conditions that any knowledge legitimising the use of 
force must be based on certainty. 
THREAT - WHEN TO USE FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In this section we will outline the main threats legitimating the use of force under 
international law. Doing so, we will establish what constitutes threats to 
international law within both IHRL and IHL. Under IHRL, we will show how the 
threat is based on a law enforcement paradigm, where the use of lethal force 
manifests the logic of reaction. Subsequently we will turn to the laws of war, and the 
construction of legitimate use of force in course of armed conflicts. We will explain 
legitimate threats within both jus ad bellum (laws on the recourse to war) and jus in 
bello (laws on the conduct of war), and discuss the importance of the principles of 
necessity and proportionality. We will show how the reliance on an interdependency 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, when establishing legitimacy of the use of 
force, articulates the same logic of reaction, by relying on the right to self-defence. 
We will establish that the chain of signification is constituted by the nodal points of 
acts of aggression and the immediate threat to life, conditioned by their reliance on 
pre-existing legal vocabularies. Concluding, we will outline how the logic of reaction 
within international law differs from the logic of precaution established within the 
US drone program. 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW - IMMEDIATE THREAT TO LIFE 
One of most basic principles enshrined in international human rights law (IHRL) is 
the inherent right to life, as inscribed in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights’ article 6. The only incident under IHRL where the use of lethal force 
is justified is in cases of immediate threats to the life of others or the life of the 
nation, and in such cases only when all peaceful remedies are deemed to be 
incomprehensible. 
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It is a general principle under IHRL that any use of force must be the last resort and 
non-arbitrary, as enshrined in Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)  : 44
“Every Human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall 
be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life.” 
A doctrinal covenant on the use of force under IHRL is the ‘Basic principles on the 
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials’  . Under principle 9 of the 45
covenant it is stated that the use of lethal force of firearms must only be employed 
when strictly unavoidable for protecting life, and only when non-lethal measures are 
insufficient. Thus, the UN Special Rapporteur notes that the the use of lethal force by 
for example police forces, are only legitimate insofar as the targeted individual is 
“about to kill someone” and possibilities of detainment are not present.   46
Underlining principles of due process and the right to fair trial, founded on clear 
incriminating evidence of past or present actions of an individual, this law 
enforcement paradigm (Kessler & Werner, 2008: 296-7) is then shortcut by the 
concept of imminent threat, as it does not relate to past or present actions, but rather 
threats of future actions; it is not mandated that criminal responsibility should be 
established beforehand. However, the state is obliged to demonstrate that the use of 
lethal force was indeed necessary - by instigating prompt and determinate 
investigation into the necessity and justification for the use of force  . The logic of 47
reaction remain in this instance: the uncertainty of the future is structured by review 
processes, that in any case establishes the criminal or unlawful physical harm to 
others, thus legitimising the use of force. 
!  UN OHCHR: “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (hereinafter 44
ICCPR), Article 6; see also the note by the UN Sec Gen reg. human rights and the use 
of force: UN General Assembly: “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions” A/68/382, para. 32.
!  OHCHR: “Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 45
Officials” (hereinafter Principles of Use of Force in Law Enforcement), principle 9: 
“Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-
defence or defense of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to 
prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, 
to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to 
prevent his or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to 
achieve these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be 
made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.”
!  UN General Assembly: “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 46
summary or arbitrary executions” A/68/382, para. 33.
!  UN Economic and Social Council: “Effective prevention and investigation of extra-47
legal, arbitrary and summary executions”, E/1989/91, note esp. Principle 9; UN 
OHCHR: “Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials”, Principles 22-23;
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THE LAWS OF WAR: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUS AD BELLUM AND JUS IN BELLO FOR 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THREATS 
Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), we find two types of threats: the 
threats of actions by other states and the threats constituted by members of the 
military under armed conflict. The distinction between these two types of threat are 
related to the distinction between the two bodies of law regulating warfare: jus ad 
bellum, concerned with the legal justification for the use of force against another 
state or entity, and jus in bello, concerned with what constitutes legitimate conduct 
during hostilities, including who constitutes legitimate targets. 
Jus ad bellum: 
Perhaps the most defining principle of the framework of present international law is 
that all states should refrain from threat or use of force against other states, as it is 
inscribed in the charter of the UN.   This principle is the cornerstone of the laws 48
governing the justification for war and the use of force in armed conflict; meaning 
that all legitimate use of force are exceptions to this rule. 
Article 51 of the UN charter states though that states are inherently entitled to self-
defence, in the event that an attack occurs against them  . The International Court of 49
Justice (ICJ) deemed, in their ruling on the “Military and Paramilitary activities in 
and against Nicaragua” that any act of self-defence under jus ad bellum must adhere 
to the principles of necessity and proportionality  . The principle of proportionality 50
ensures that the scale of force used in self-defence is not disproportionate to the 
threat faced. In the ICJ advisory opinion on the question of the use of Nuclear 
Weapons, it is stated that “... in any case any right of recourse to [belligerent] 
reprisals would, like self-defence, be governed inter alia by the principle of 
proportionality.”   Thus, proportionality ensures that the logic inherent in the 51
legitimisation of use of force is based on reactions, which ensure the stability of the 
system, by precluding the legitimacy of acts of aggression or punishment. 
!  Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter UN Charter), Article 2, para 4: “All 48
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”
!  UN Charter, Article 51 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 49
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security … “
!  ICJ: “Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua 50
(Judgment)” (hereinafter Nicaragua case), p. 103, para. 914
!  Nuclear Weapons Case, p. 245 para. 4651
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The Principle of  Necessity and Anticipatory Self-defence 
The principle of necessity implies that any state must be able to present evidence that 
the act of self-defence was necessary to repel an attack or prevent an imminent threat 
to its individual or collective self-determination. Whereas proportionality relates to 
the amount or type of force used in order to successfully repel an imminent threat, 
necessity thus relates to whether the use of armed force in self-defence is necessary 
in order to repel the attack. Although Article 51 expressly states that self-defence may 
only be undertaken if an armed attack occurs, the principle of necessity has 
nonetheless been used in a number of cases for legitimising anticipatory self-defence 
(Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert, 2012: 135). Although the practice has not been 
recognised as part of positive international law, some states have invoked it as part of 
customary international law since the Caroline affair  . 52
Then US Secretary of State during the following case litigation stated that such use of 
anticipatory or preemptive force only when “the necessity of that self-defence is 
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of 
deliberation” (cited in Arend 2003: 91). The ICJ have not ruled on the legality of 
anticipatory self-defence, neither deeming illegal nor legal (Armstrong, Farrell & 
Lambert, 2012: 135). While no provision in positive law confirms any legality of the 
use of anticipatory self-defence, any legitimacy must then be based on the existence 
of customary law or opinio juris on the matter. Certainly, the Caroline affair and 
numerous accounts in the after-war period would seem to justify that some degree of 
anticipatory self-defence is justifiable under customary international law. One 
example is the Israeli strike on the Egyptian air force, based on the imminency and 
scale of the threat posed by the hostile intent of the arabian states, running up to the 
Six Day War   (ibid.). It is not within the purview of our analysis to evaluate the 53
lawfulness of imminence as legitimation for the use of force preemptively, but rather 
to establish the use of force within the knowledge paradigm of international law. As 
such, clinging to the wording of Article 51   and the accounts of justified preemptive 54
!  The “Caroline affair” refers to the case under 1837 British-Canadian conflict, where 52
British troops destroyed an American warship, allegedly aiding the canadian 
rebellion, on American territory (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2012: 135; pp. 
134-137 for a brief overview of the application of anticipatory self-defence; for an 
excerpt of the following diplomatic correspondence, see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
19th_century/br-1842d.asp#web1 (accessed dec 16 2013).
!  For the nature of the threat posed to the Israeli state, invoked as the reasoning 53
behind acting, the official decision was as follows: “After hearing reports on the 
military and diplomatic situation from the prime minister, the defense minister, the 
chief of staff and the head of IDF intelligence, the Government has determined that 
the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan are deployed for a multi-front attack that 
threatens Israel's existence. It is therefore decided to launch a military strike aimed at 
liberating Israel from encirclement and preventing assault by the United Arab 
Command." (cited in Ersun, 2007, see note 2)
!  Article 51 of the UN Charter, explicitly states that the right of self-defence is 54
legitimate “if an armed attack occurs against” the member state (emphasis added).
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uses of force described above, it suffices to say that any use of preemptive force 
should be conditioned on the limits of time (instancy) and scope (overwhelming) of 
the threat as asserted by Webster during the Caroline case. 
Concluding, within the frames of jus ad bellum, the threat which justifies the use of 
force, must be a response that is necessary in order to defend and proportionate to 
the sought effect of the use of force - namely, repelling an attack. Thus, it is 
ultimately based on a logic of reaction; even if we submit to a legality of anticipatory 
self-defence it must be based on an imminent and overwhelming threat “leaving no 
time for deliberation” (Webster, 1841), thereby relying on action to be taken only as a 
response to a threat. 
Jus in bello: 
During armed conflict, what constitutes a legitimate target, and hence a threat, under 
international law, is dependent on the ascription of combatant status. In situations of 
armed conflicts, the targeting of individuals is reliant on their status as combatants 
affiliated with one of the (armed) parties to the conflict. 
International and Non-International Armed Conflicts - Direct Participation in Hostilities 
The principle of distinction between civilians, or non-combatants, and combatants 
during international armed conflict are enshrined in the doctrinal Geneva 
Conventions and their additional protocols. Thus, Article 44 and 48 of the Protocol 
Additional state that combatants, as members of the armed forces to a party in the 
conflict, must be distinguishable from the civilian population and “Parties to the 
conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants 
and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives.”   55
For the sake of assigning status of combatancy to individuals during armed conflict, 
the framework of IHL is pertinent in both cases of international (typically state-state) 
and non-international (originally assumed as internal) armed conflict. Responses to 
global terrorism and especially the contemporary use of drones and targeted killings, 
have raised questions of the possibility of establishing norms for transnational non-
international armed conflicts, as states engage in armed conflict with non-state 
actors on the territory of other states (see Ohlin 2013: 29-30 for a short outline). For 
the sake of our argument, we shall shortly outline the differences between 
!  ICRC: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 55
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 
(hereinafter PA I), 8 June 1979, Article 48; for the principle of distinction, see also 
ICJ, 1996: “Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion)”, p. 245 para. 
77-79
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international and non-international armed conflicts vis-a-vis IHL and it’s 
consequences for establishing combatancy. 
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 establishes the applicability of 
the provisions of IHL to international armed conflict. Common Article 3 to the 
conventions establishes a set of minimum criteria which are to be upheld during 
armed conflict “not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of 
the High Contracting Parties”.   Furthermore, in the Tadic case, the International 56
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) underlined the applicability of 
the provisions of IHL under non-international, internal armed conflicts  . The Rome 57
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) reaffirms this interpretation of the 
applicability of IHL to internal armed conflicts within a state.   Notwithstanding the 58
contestation over the applicability of IHL to, or even legality of, transnational armed 
conflicts between state actors and non-state actors in another territory, it is broadly 
affirmed that the provisions of IHL apply to armed conflicts of both international 
and non-international character. The distinction between combatant and civilian in 
armed conflicts of a non-international nature has, however, been far from steadfast. 
In their Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
under International Humanitarian Law, the ICRC provides a (albeit contentious) 
interpretation of Common Article 3 during non-international armed conflict: 
“... all persons who are not members of State armed forces or 
organized armed groups of a party to the conflict are civilians 
and, therefore, entitled to protection against direct attack unless 
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”   59
!  ICRC: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 56
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 3
!  ICTY: “Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka. “Dule” - Decision on the defense motion for 57
interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction”, para. 70: “ ... we find that an armed conflict 
exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed 
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the 
initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until 
a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a 
peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law 
continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of 
internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not 
actual combat takes place there.”
!  ICC:Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute to the ICC: “Paragraph 2 (e) [establishing 58
“violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict”] applies to armed 
conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place 
in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.”
!  ICRC, Melzer (2009): Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation 59
in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, p. 29
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This interpretation of Common Article 3, Article 1 of the AP II   and Article 51 of the 60
AP I   above, leads to a conception of the distinction principle, where affiliation 61
“depend on whether the continuous function assumed by an individual corresponds 
to that collectively exercised by the group as a whole, namely the conduct of 
hostilities on behalf of a non-State party to the conflict.” (ICRC 2009: 33). The 
contentious nature of this interpretation is not within our scope  , nor is it our aim to 62
evaluate the legality of this interpretation. The “continuous combat function” implied 
above presumes the “lasting integration into an organized armed group” and as such 
is based on the establishment of past and present activities in order to establish the 
legality of specific targeting. 
The threats considered legitimate under IHL are thereby of an “institutionalised” 
nature (Kessler & Werner, 2008). They are not threats based on their actions 
themselves, but rather because of their ascribed status as combatants, part of an 
armed force in the conflict. Congruently, it is not the individual which is criminally 
responsible for its actions as under the IHRL, or law enforcement, paradigm, but 
rather the individual becomes a threat only through its status as combatant. 
LOGIC OF REACTION: THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF JUS AD BELLUM AND JUS IN BELLO WHEN 
ESTABLISHING LEGALITY 
The conceptualisation of threats under jus in bello as ‘institutionalised’, would seem 
to imply prevention; as the ascription of status does not establish responsibility to 
the individual, but rather affirms its capacity to inflict harm on the victim. However, 
we will argue that this logic of ascribed status does not circumvent the logic of 
reaction within jus ad bellum, as the two branches of law are not independent of each 
other, when it comes to establishing legality of the use of force in armed conflict. 
The distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum is different in the present 
state, where the use of force is prohibited. Under ‘Just War’ theory, the earliest 
attempt to establish the legality of wars, what is now termed jus in bello, did not 
establish rights to the aggressor, but only to the state defending itself or righting the 
wrongdoing of others (Moussa, 2008: 966; Kolb, 1997). Rather, whether the war or 
!  ICRC: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 60
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 
June 1979, Article 1: “This protocol … apply to all armed conflicts … which take place 
in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, 
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.”
!  ICRC: PA I, Article 51 (3): “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this 61
Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”
!  See e.g. Schmitt (2010) for a discussion of the contentiousness of the interpretive 62
guidance and its constitutive elements
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use of force was just, also determined if the means was appropriate - making the 
rights during war asymmetrical between the just and unjust party. The jus in bello 
establishing equal rights and obligations for the belligerent forces were not there, as 
their actions were considered only in light of their cause for turning to force.   When 63
laws of aggression was outlawed in the establishment of the League of Nations and 
subsequently inscribed in the UN Charter, the distinction between jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello was established as two distinct legal questions - as is evident in Preamble 
to the Protocol Additional 1 to the Geneva Conventions: 
“[The] provisions … must be fully applied in all circumstances to 
all persons who are protected by those instruments, without any 
adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed 
conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to 
the conflicts”   64
This is not to say that the two branches of law establishes legality of any action in its 
own right, but rather that an act can be lawful under one branch and unlawful under 
the other, and that the legalities of each does not have an effect on the legality in the 
other. The ICJ, in their advisory opinion on the use of nuclear weapons, considering 
the principle of proportionality, asserted that the legality of the use of force would 
have to be established in both branches in order to comply fully with IHL: 
“[A] use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-
defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of 
the law applicable in armed conflict which comprise in particular 
the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”   65
For the conception of threat under international law, this consideration of the 
relation between the two branches are pertinent. By the fact that the two branches, 
although independent in their application, does not establish the legality of use of 
force independently, it is required that both legal frameworks are complied with, in 
order to establish legality. As such, the provisions of jus in bello does not in itself 
establish legality on the use of force insofar as the provisions of jus ad bellum are not 
complied with, even though it still applies to the armed conflict. This departs from 
the just war principle in its objective and symmetrical applicability in the conduct of 
!  As Kolb (1997) describes, the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello 63
emerges in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, where recourse to war moved from 
being based on just causes to means of national policy; there was a need for an 
objective legal framework establishing the rules of conduct in war, covering every 
situation of armed conflict and each belligerent equally, as their actions were equally 
just. 
!  ICRC: PA I, Preamble64
!  Nuclear Weapons Case, p. 245 para. 4265
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war through international humanitarian law, and through the simultaneous general 
prohibition of the use force.   66
THREATS: ACTS OF AGGRESSION AND IMMEDIATE THREATS TO LIFE 
We have found three nodal points establishing the construction of legitimate threats 
under international law: First, the IHRL paradigm relies on an immediate threat to 
life in order for the use of lethal force to be legal, which is established as a logic of 
reaction by its reliance on criminal physical threat to arbitrarily deprive life. Second, 
we established the conditions applying to the laws of war and the framework of jus 
ad bellum, and its reliance on response to threats either established as imminent or 
present armed attacks, which legitimise the use of force in self-defence applying the 
principles of proportionality and necessity. Last, we defined the nature of 
institutionalised threats under jus in bello, and showed its reliance on establishing 
past and present activities of individuals in order to establish their affiliation with an 
armed force. Furthermore, we showed how the interdependency of the two 
frameworks, when establishing legitimate uses of force, articulates the logic of 
reaction present within international law. Thus, the threat constructed under 
international law is one of acts of aggression or breaches of peace. 
While terrorist attacks can be understood as acts of aggression, the strict legal 
vocabularies concerned with armed conflicts is complicated to apply to the US drone 
program, and consequently, the difference in threats between the US drone program 
and international law becomes fishy. The precautionary logic within US policy 
conceptualises the threat of terrorism as constant and indeterminate in its outcome, 
thereby legitimising drone strikes as acts of self-defence. Conceptualising self-
defence under international law, which is reliant on the availability of obtaining 
certainty of the exact type of threat as overwhelming and instant, is thereby 
challenged by the logic of precaution in US drone program. The distinction between 
wars of choice and wars of necessity is thus blurred in the US drone program, where 
the terrorism war becomes constantly necessary due to the prevailing anticipation of 
the next terrorist attack. 
RESPONSIBILITY 
As established, the raison d’être of the international legal project is to regulate and 
judge upon established facts and distinctions, serving to order and structure a then 
treatable social reality. In this section we will show how the international legal 
discourse posits the attribution of non-innocence or wrongdoing as vital to justify the 
!  See Nuclear Weapons Case, p. 246 para. 46, for the illegality of armed reprisals 66
during peace-time, as would not necessarily be the case under theories of Just War, 
where inter alia the concept of punishing wrongful behaviour and “righting 
wrongs” (Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 2012: 128).
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use of force on both individuals and states. Specifically, we will show how 
responsibility associates to some basic notions of the law enforcement paradigm. 
Further, it will be argued that responsibility occurs in the logics of legal norms 
structuring the use of force under armed conflict. Here, the attribution of 
responsibility is primarily linked to the actions of a sovereign state, despite these 
actions being undertaken by individuals. Thus, the nodal points establishing this 
chain of signification are individual (criminal) responsibility and state responsibility, 
conditioned by trial and investigation based on pre-existing legal vocabularies. 
It will be concluded that common for both law paradigms is that the conditions 
wherein lethal force may be justified are demarcated and restricted through the 
structuring of distinct legal norms, relying on establishment of responsibility for past 
events and intents. This conclusion underlines the argument that lethal force in 
international law is primarily based upon a logic of reaction. 
THE NON-ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE 
The ICCPR principle of ‘the right to life’   is the only inherent right of international 67
law - making it an essential right for every individual human being, whenever, 
wherever (Kretzmer, 2005: 177). Prohibiting any arbitrary deprivation of a person’s 
life  , it refers to fundamental international human rights law regulating and 68
structuring the use of force. Here, the right to life is given meaning in sharp 
opposition to the ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life - subsequently turning the question of 
when the intentional deprivation of a person’s will violate that person’s right to life, 
contingent on the interpretation of arbitrariness (Kretzmer, 2005: 177). 
The ICCRP does not map out precise scenarios in which intentional use of force do 
not violate the right to life. Contextualising to the legitimate use of force however, 
below will follow some legal scenarios wherein lethal use of force may not amount to 
be considered arbitrary. First, it will be argued that when contextualised under the 
paradigm of human rights, non-arbitrary scenarios fall under the ‘law enforcement’ 
or criminal justice paradigm. Here, the intentional use of force is monopolised by the 
state, and can only be justified in very few and restricted situations (Kretzmer, 2005: 
175). 
THE ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY: IHRL 
The ICCRP states that a state is bound to respect and ensure the rights enshrined in 
its Covenant for “all individuals in its territory and subject to its juris-
!  Article 6 of the ICCRP, 1966.67
!  This applies also the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as the African 68
Charter of Human and People’s Rights.
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diction” (ICCRP, Article 2(1)). Arbitrary is then first recognised dependent on the 
constellation of the nation state. Through the idea of state responsibility, arbitrary 
deprivation of life should then be avoided and the right to life upheld. Reifying the 
basic Western relationship between citizen and state, wherein the monopoly of 
violence belongs to the state, international law tends to refer international arbitrary 
actions to be criminalised by domestic judgement. As such, responsibility becomes 
indirect by obliging states “to incorporate individual criminal responsibility for 
certain acts within their domestic systems” (Kessler and Werner, 2008: 297). 
Structuring and regulating the use of force within domestic legal systems, is the ‘law 
enforcement’ or criminal justice paradigm. The law enforcement paradigm does not 
only allow an individual who is responsible for a criminal act to be judged forcefully 
by the respective state of that individual, but it also provides a certain legal 
protection for the individual as a citizen (Gross, 2006: 323). 
Associating to the idea that states can prosecute and take action against their citizens 
based on these individuals’ guiltiness of wrongdoing, the concept of responsibility 
under the law enforcement paradigm relates to notions of wrongfulness, attribution 
of guilt, restoration and deterrence  . Disconnecting itself from normative 69
judgements of power and politics though, the authority of law attempts to remove 
any arbitrariness from its realm by establishing a legal, ‘scientific’ and pure 
proceeding in the attribution of guilt and application of force, which only the 
authority of the law can invoke. This process is under the law enforcement paradigm 
realised through basic notions of criminal procedure or ‘law enforcement measures’, 
necessitating the upholding of rights and establishment of facts before any 
judgement  , as before any action against an individual can be taken the proof of 70
guilt is necessitated. Even law enforcement officials are obliged not to use force 
!  As Ewald argues (1986 in Kessler og Werner, 2008: 296), the attribution of 69
responsibility in modern societies is particularly important, as it through the threat of 
legal sanctions and enforcement of the law, functions as deterrence. The rule of law is 
then reinforced by the responsibility to uphold the law, and placement of guilt and 
punishment if this responsibility is not upheld.
!  Kretzmer, 2005: 178; For the definition of law enforcement measures, they must be 70
compatible with: ”1. every individual benefits from the presumption of innocence; 2. 
persons suspected of perpetrating or planning serious criminal acts should be 
arrested, detained and interrogated with due process of law; and 3. if there is credible 
evidence that such persons were indeed involved in planning, promoting, aiding and 
abetting or carrying out terrorist acts they should be afforded a fair trial before a 
competent and independent court and, if convicted, sentenced by the court to a 
punishment provided by law.“ See the ICCRP Article 9(3), 14 and 15.
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unless in a situation of last resort   and the only legitimate application of force by the 71
state is then realised only through the authority of law   and is closely linked to an 72
intentional search for truth based upon the verification of facts and legal reasoning. 
‘Innocent until proven guilty’, the notion of responsibility in the law enforcement 
model connects with some fundamental values of the rule of law which, resting its 
legitimacy on being able to protect the citizen, also necessitates the presumption of 
innocence and the right to fair trial before action is taken (Kessler and Werner, 
2008: 295). Furthermore, the idea that no crime can be committed and that no 
judgement or punishment can be realised before the existence of a pre-existing 
penal-law, is a basic maxim of old European thinking, which has been integrated into 
international criminal and humans right law, subsequently prohibiting any ex post 
facto law,   both in domestic and international fora. The attribution of responsibility 73
then necessarily relies on a past tense logic wherein one can only link wrongful and 
unjust events to the past wrongful and unjust behaviour of certain individuals, 
thereby reinforcing the logic of applying only pre-existing policies. 
TRIAL AND INVESTIGATION 
Finally, the attribution of responsibility and the use of non-arbitrary force in 
international human rights law, and the law enforcement models under which they 
are enforced, essentially hinge upon two conditions; first, a ‘past tense logic’ of 
whether the factual linking of past unjust events to certain unjust behaviours of 
individuals, can be constructed through fair trial. Second, it hinges upon whether any 
pre-existing policies are applicable to the committed actions in question. This last 
condition is in international human rights law dependent on the structures of 
differing domestic legal systems, as criminals are first conceived of as citizens, or 
subjects to the law of a state. It can only be the responsibility of the respective state 
!  In the Principles of the Use of Force in Law Enforcement, it is stated that “Law 71
enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-
violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force 
and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of 
achieving the intended result“ Whilst no mention of imminency is made, other 
principles of the document obliges any casualty result to be investigated in relation to 
notions of last resort (as warning signs should be made) and proportionality, making 
possible the prosecution of the law enforcement official if not adhering to these 
standards.
!  In opposition to the highest political authority, for example - in countries where 72
rule of law is apart from political hierarchies.
!  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights holds that “(2) No one shall be held 73
guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute 
a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was 
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed” than the one that was applicable 
at the time the penal offence was committed.” Article 11(2). The same is stated in the 
ICCRP Article 15(1).
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to, under domestic law, enforce criminalisation of an individual’s unlawful conduct 
and establish further jurisdiction if this is perceived needed  . 74
Hence, the applicability of definitions and distinctions of different domestic legal 
vocabularies have a great say in recognising certain actions as unlawful or criminal. 
Still though, the international ‘inherent right to life’ suggests that law enforcement 
models with establishment of trials must be in place, to avoid arbitrariness.  75
Consequently, it is not possible under this law paradigm to prevent criminal acts 
through elimination of perpetrators (but only to halt these if in a situation of last 
resort) as a criminal process establishing facts, must always proceed judgement and 
law-enforcement officials who exercise the monopoly of violence of the state, are 
obliged to apply, as it is possible, non-violent means. Any immediate action must be 
justified as last resort and of as self-defence. 
LIFTING RESPONSIBILITY TO STATE LEVEL: IHL 
Established above, was that states under certain restricted conditions can justify the 
intentional use of lethal force. The legitimacy of this lethal force can only be realised 
in the case of an existential ‘last resort’(a necessity) or on a past tense logic - 
subsequently making any intentional deprivation of life   possible only through 76
application of guilt for an already committed action. As such, it can be argued that 
legitimate uses of force under international human rights law cannot attribute 
individuals ‘hostility’ or harmfulness based on certain characteristics, but only 
responsibility and guilt if proven guilty on the basis of a committed action (Kessler 
and Werner, 2008: 297). Under international humanitarian law though, the 
legitimate use of lethal force cannot be justified through attribution of guilt, but only 
be applied under conditions defined as of hostility and harmfulness. Below, it will be 
argued that the lifting of responsibility and the subsequent invocation of a certain 
form of moral innocence - reserved for combatants under conditions of war - instead 
results in an attribution of responsibility on the state. 
!  This was the case with the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of 74
Terrorist Bombings, which criminalised terrorist bombings, but by doing this, also 
referring trial and judgement to individual states. See Article 4 of the UN Convention.
!  However, a state may disregard certain rights during a state of emergency. Under 75
this state, a state may apply administrative detention, which does not involve 
criminal trials. However, it can be argued that the right disregarded here is that of 
personal liberty, not that of life, as a state may not disregard the right to fair trial 
needed to protect the right to life. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 
29 on Article 4 of ICCPR, 31 Aug. 2001; The necessity of a trial process before lethal 
action is taken is underlined by the ICCRP’s Article 6(4) “4. Anyone sentenced to 
death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, 
pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases.”
!  Using the word ‘intentional’ here, we do not aim to encompass immediate threats. 76
The response to these would not fall under intentional, but a kind of existential 
necessity.
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Although the right to life under the law enforcement paradigm was defined as 
inherent - thus prevailing in times of both peace and war - the laws of war may in 
times of armed conflict supersede law enforcement models, through their status as 
lex specialis  . This was established by the ICJ in the ruling of the Nuclear Weapons 77
case of 1996. Confirming that the law enforcement paradigm would not cease in 
times of  hostilities, it was however added that; 
“In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life 
applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary 
deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the 
applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed 
conflict, which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. 
Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain 
weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of 
life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant can only be decided by 
reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced 
from the terms of the Covenant itself.”    78
The ruling of the ICJ determines the right to life as inherent, but makes an important 
distinction based on the term arbitrary - as the meaning of arbitrary in times of 
hostilities arguably differ from arbitrary under peacetime conditions. It is implied 
that deprivation of life without preceding trial under times of hostility could be 
understood as a lawful act of war. 
Under the laws of war, the idea of non-arbitrariness remains vital for the justification 
of using force. However, the intentional placement of guilt as a non-arbitrary 
rationale for using force, is here superseded by the non-arbitrary rationale of a need 
to counter a hostility. Specifically, it is the combatant who gains the right to apply 
and be subject to lethal force during hostility. This gained right and vulnerability is 
not the consequence of a certain guiltiness or immediate danger attributed to the 
combatant, but rather the gained right is the consequence of the status he possesses 
as a combatant  . Combatants are as such legitimate targets because of their status 79
indicating their “part of an organisation (the military) that institutionally represents 
!  “law governing a specific subject matter”77
!  ICJ, Nuclear Weapons Case, para 2578
!  In the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, the absence of 79
responsibility and the importance of status of combatants are manifested in the 
articles 41, where it is formulated that incapacitated or surrendering combatants stop 
being legitimate targets of war, 44(3) where it is formulated that combatants can only 
be targeted legitimately on their status as combatants; carrying signs and arms 
openly. Also see the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners in 
War, 1929 ,wherein it is indicated that the primary purpose of detaining prisoners of 
war is to prevent their participation in hostilities, not the punishment of such 
committed hostilities before or in the future. Hence prisoners of war are to be 
released once war is over, unless they can be prosecuted for individual acts, which do 
not fall under the laws of war. Then responsibility is attributed the combatant as an 
!63
danger” (Kessler and Werner, 2008: 298). As such, the combatant himself is 
deprived of responsibility  . He cannot be held responsible for his organisation, but 80
it is rather the organisation, often the state, that can be attributed responsibility for 
committing hostilities. As already shown, legitimate use of force for a state parties 
are structured through the described conditions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. If 
not adhering to these principles, a state party may be guilty of breaches to peace and 
responsible for acts of violence - what can also be defined as ‘internationally 
wrongful acts’ under laws of state responsibility. The laws of state responsibility are 
to determine when a state is breaching an international obligation of international 
law and what legal consequences might follow this breach. The International Law 
Commission’s   recent draft articles on the Responsibility of States for 81
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) was cited by the ICJ ruling in the 1997 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case between Hungary and Slovakia. The notion of state 
responsibility was given meaning for the first time in international law, as it was 
stated that, 
“Nor does the Court need to dwell upon the question of the 
relationship between the law of treaties and the law of State 
responsibility … as those two branches of international law 
obviously have a scope that is distinct. A determination of whether 
a convention is or is not in force, and whether it has or has not 
been properly suspended or denounced, is to be made pursuant to 
the law of treaties. On the other hand, an evaluation of the extent 
to which the suspension or denunciation of a convention, seen as 
incompatible with the law of treaties, involves the responsibility of 
the State which proceeded to it, is to be made under the law of 
state responsibility.”   82
The responsibility articles do then not deal directly with a breach of a treaty, but the 
concept of absolute responsibility of a state in case of internationally wrongful acts. 
These are defined as the consistency of an action or omission attributable to a state 
under international law, constituting a breach of international obligation of that state 
(Rosenne, 2007: 517). The law of state responsibility then makes it possible to 
establish a causal relation between a state’s breach of international obligations and a 
verifiable wrongful official act of that sovereign state’s (de facto) representative, to 
!  As long as he respects the laws of war. If that is not the case, he can be prosecuted 80
for war crimes (the violation of IHL), which is treated through law enforcement 
models of individual criminal responsibility.
!  The UN decided to in 1945 codify the laws of state responsibility by setting up the 81
International Law Commission. They were to establish internationally wrongful acts, 
defined by only being attributable to states which would in committing the acts 
commit a break of that state’s international obligation (Amao, 2011: 173-174)
!  ICJ, "Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 82
Judgment of 25 September 1997", para. 47
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deem non-repetition, cessation and duty of full reparation   on that state. General 83
principles of international humanitarian and international human rights law, such as 
the principles of precaution, necessity and proportionality, also further underline the 
attribution of responsibility to the state, when in international humanitarian 
contexts. Specifically, it is the ‘command’ or superior responsibility, inscribed first in 
the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which entails an articulated 
doctrine of hierarchical accountability in cases of war crimes  . Herein the 84
commander, if knowable of wrongdoing and not preventing or reporting on this, is 
attributed full responsibility for the wrongdoing of his lower-ranging. This can be 
perceived of as a general doctrine of how the highest ranging or sovereign in 
command, if knowing, is bearing responsibility for his organisation under conflict. 
The elaboration of the Rome Statute and the establishment of the ICC can be seen as 
codification and institutionalisation of the doctrine of command responsibility  . 85
Whilst war tribunals have long prosecuted officials of governments, the ICC 
represents the possibility of internationally pursuing prosecution in an 
institutionalised manner. And combining the arisal of the ICC with the principle of 
responsibility to protect, the idea of international state responsibility is combined 
with international human rights law obligations, and opens subsequently for the 
possibility of not only internationally pursuing and deeming reparation, but also 
prosecution of sovereigns and officials. 
A LOGIC OF REACTION 
Within international law, it is categories and distinctions such as of civilian from 
combatant and the commanding or sovereign from combatant, which are vital to 
determine when force can be used legitimately. Common for both types of 
responsibility undertaken in this section, is that - whether it falls back on an 
individual or an official representative - cannot be attributed before facts have been 
shown. Differing in the two types of responsibility is that whereas the use of lethal 
!  See the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on the responsibility of 83
States for internationally wrongful acts, Article 30 and 31 in the Draft Articles. See 
also article 33(1).
!  Article 86(2) of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions states that: “the 84
fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a 
subordinate does not absolve his superiors from ... responsibility ... if they knew, or 
had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at 
the time, that he was committing or about to commit such a breach and if they did 
not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.” In 
article 87 the commander is obliged to "prevent and, where necessary, to suppress 
and report to competent authorities" any violation of the Conventions, and Article 
86(2) "explicitly address the knowledge factor of command responsibility".
!  Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute to the ICC states that military commanders can 85
be attributed individual responsibility for crimes committed by forces if under their 
command and “either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have 
known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes.”
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force - and force in general - can be applied punitively in law enforcement models, 
international humanitarian law do not evolve around the presumption of guilt and 
the application of punitive force in the attribution of responsibility. Rather, is the use 
of force here based on notions of moral innocence as the legitimate use of force is 
only to be countering hostility. Deterrence and punishment in the international 
sphere happens mostly through non-violent judgements. It is the concept of 
sovereignty which takes a central place here, as the sovereign has the monopoly on 
violence in his territory. However, there is no monopoly of applying force 
internationally. And whilst the UNSC may legitimately intervene in a country to 
maintain international order, this intervention will always be one of politics 
upholding law, not law judging itself. As Gross (2006: 23) argues, there may be 
attributions of responsibility on many levels in the international sphere, but the 
meaning of responsibility takes fundamentally different forms in the domestic and 
the international: whereas it in the former only relates legitimate uses of force to 
notions of presumption and application of guilt, legitimate use of force is in the latter 
associated to the right to use force  . The right to use force of combatants and 86
sovereign officials is dependent on their adherence to their moral innocence by 
reliance on self-defence, though. If not adhering to this, they may also subject to trial 
for breaking laws of war. 
So whilst laws of war may invoke exceptions, common for both individual and state 
responsibility is then that when evolving the attribution of guilt and responsibility, 
these must always be proven and verifiable in a past tense logic that complies with 
ideas of fair trial, investigation of facts and pre-exiting legal vocabulary. 
Subsequently the use of lethal force in relation to attribution of guilt and 
responsibility can only be legitimised in terms of reaction to past events. Thus, we 
establish that a chain of signification run through the nodal points of state and 
individual responsibility, as they are both structured by the nodal point of trial and 
investigation. 
Whereas the frameworks of international law has a strict distinction and hierarchy 
between the law enforcement paradigm and the laws of war, the US drone program 
conflates this distinction when targeting individuals. The presumption of radical 
uncertainty within the US drone program conditions the construction of 
responsibility on individuals, both through the AUMF (as punitive actions) and 
through the establishment of the targeted individuals as posing a constant imminent 
threat to the US. 
!  If the laws of war are violated however, the rights to use force are removed from 86
combatants and officials, and they are then referred to models of individual criminal 
responsibility again. See footnotes 83, 82, 79
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Furthermore, the US drone program, in the targeting of individuals based on their 
association to Al-Qaeda forces and terrorist behaviour are ascribed with criminal 
responsibility for historical acts (9/11), without the establishment of certain and legal 
proof, but rather through conjectural knowledge construction. The logic of 
precaution as embedded in the US drone program thus arguably challenge the 
distinction between the two legal frameworks of international law in basing present 
actions on anticipated future actions, justified by association to and not participation 
in past actions. 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Turning to the concept of accountability in international law, we will shortly outline 
the main sources of accountability: namely the possibility of judicially establishing 
whether states and other actors comply with the norms and legal frameworks 
established. We will shortly discuss the issue of transparency and information 
availability in the context of legitimate use of force - a contested subject vis-a-vis the 
US drone program. We establish a chain of signification around the nodal points of 
compliance, relying on, transparency and availability of information and reporting, 
besides the independent fact-finding investigations under the legal bodies. 
Within international law, the main sources of accountability, or the establishment of 
legality of actions, are the courts and legal bodies established through treaties, such 
as the ICC, ICTY and ICJ to undertake judicial rulings and opine on the state of 
customary and positive provisions of international law. For the conduct of hostilities 
and armed conflict, the most notable courts have been the ones established to try 
individuals on, amongst others, accusations of crimes against humanity during the 
course of armed conflict. The ICJ is the principal advisory and judicial body of the 
UN system, ruling on the present legal order as established in positive and customary 
law, by interpreting treaties, international law, breaches to these obligations and 
liability of reparation to be made for these breaches. Thus, the rulings of the 
international bodies establish the legality of past actions and presents advice for 
actions in order to accord with international law. Despite their judicial role, the ICJ 
does not in and by itself establish any provisions or measures to be taken in order to 
secure conformity on the part of states to the rulings.   The ICC on the other hand 87
possess the judicial ability to decide on sentencing of convicted individuals.   88
!  ICJ,  Statute of the Court: Article 59 states that “The decision of the Court has no 87
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” As 
such, it is within the bodies of the UN to consider whether action should be taken to 
ensure compliance. This of course implies the applicability of veto rights within the 
UNSC.
!  It should be mentioned in the same breath, that it is only the parties to the Rome 88
Statute that falls within its jurisdiction, thus excluding amongst others the US.
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The principle role of the international courts is to establish juridically the compliance 
of states and individuals with legal norms established in the system. In order to 
establish the juridical base for establishing compliance, the Statute to the ICJ states 
that “The Court may, even before the hearing begins, call upon the agents [of the 
states] to produce any document or to supply any explanations. Formal note shall be 
taken of any refusal.”   Furthermore, the ICJ can, under any procedure and advisory 89
opinion rely on expert opinions and enquiries undertaken by external bodies in order 
to establish proof and evidence.   90
Concerning targeted killings, vibrant opinions have been voiced over the attainability 
of information from official sources on the compliance with international law, both 
within public and UN discourse.   The ICJ in the Nicaragua Case ruled that if the 91
principle of self-defence in Charter 51 is used for justification of the use of force, 
there is grounds to consider any reluctance to report to the UNSC about the use of 
force in question as “indicating whether the State in question was itself convinced 
that it was acting in self-defence.”   Although the ruling does not establish a duty to 92
report in order to establish legality of self-defence, it presents the reliance on 
availability of information and cooperative willingness of states, in order to ensure 
systemic stability. 
Concluding we can establish that international law and the institutions establishing 
accountability within the system is constructed by a chain of signification consisting 
of two main nodal points: First, the judicial establishment of norm compliance 
through existing legal vocabularies, and second, the availability of information 
needed for establishing the legality of certain actions. Both systems underscore the 
logic of reaction; as it must be possible to present pertinent evidence justifying 
actions, any use of force must be applied as a reaction to well established, tangible 
threats. 
This is opposed to the US drone program, where security is equated with policies of 
secrecy, in order to maintain an adaptive policy. The availability of information and 
reporting of conducts to international bodies are seen as weakening security within 
!   ICJ, Statute of the Court: Article 4989
!  ICJ, Statute of the Court: Article 50: "The Court may, at any time, entrust any 90
individual, body, bureau, commission, or other organisation that it may select, with 
the task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion.”
!  See for example the reports by special rapporteurs to the UNGA on targeted 91
killings: e.g. A/68/389 and A/68/382
!  Nicaragua case, para. 200 92
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the US policy, whereas it is seen as a condition for establishing whether there have 
been compliance with pre-existing international law. 
!
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CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The central logic drawn from our analysis of international law and the legitimate use 
of force, is the logic of reaction. We have shown how this logic is manifested in the 
international legal discourse, when establishing and defining the nodal points 
constituting our different chains of signification within international law. In figure 
1.2, we show how the differing nodal points are interrelated and conditioned by the 
structuring of uncertainty through pre-existing legal vocabularies. 
Knowledge 
Vital to determine and structure the legitimate use of force, was first the particular 
knowledge regime upon which international law is constructed. We established that 
this knowledge regime was characterised by assuming a well-defined and recursive, 
probable ontology, of which certainty can always be obtained. Uncertainty is assessed 
and made certain through the gathering, construction and structuring of empiricist 
knowledge; absorbed into the international legal project through a clear legal 
Fig. 1.2: Legitimate use of force in international law
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vocabulary shaped from past events, manifested in positive or customary law. The 
international legal regime of knowledge deals with actions in the present, 
legitimising a reaction if it can be incorporated within the structured confines of the 
legal vocabulary. So whilst reactions on hypothesised future events shine by their 
absence in international law, it is exactly these, which are present in and 
fundamental to the US drone program. Here, the conduct of signature strikes is 
largely based on and legitimised by the anticipation of future events against which 
one can act in the here and know. This form of conjectural knowledge, wherein one 
acts despite radical uncertainties, we found to constitute a challenge to international 
law. 
Threat 
As the international legal project aims to maintain order and peace, the main threats 
of the system, are therefore acts of aggression and hostility. These threats condition 
the legitimacy of self-defence in cases of imminent threats, the means of reacting to 
armed attacks, as well as the use of lethal force as a last resort to halt immediate 
threat to life under the law enforcement paradigm. Under the laws of war, we argue 
that the frameworks of jus ad bellum and jus in bello are to be understood as 
interlinked when establishing the legality of use of force, even though they may be 
applied independently in different situations. This underpins the logic of reaction 
within international law, as the ‘institutionalised’ threats; namely, combatants, do 
not pose a legitimate threat in themselves outside armed conflict. The precautionary 
logic of the US drone program challenges this categorisation. The threat of terrorism 
is conceptualised by the US as constant and indeterminate in its outcome, thereby 
legitimising drone strikes as acts of self-defence, despite having neither clear 
evidence of the nature of the threat, nor making individual self-defence analyses for 
each drone strike. 
Responsibility 
Defining the illegality of threats, aggressions and hostilities, the international legal 
project also assumes that responsibility can be attributed to those posing or 
committing such threats or arbitrary use of force in general, which may threaten the 
right to life. Specifically, it was found that logics building on the attribution of 
responsibility takes two prevailing shapes in international contexts; international 
criminal responsibility and state responsibility. Thus, the arbitrary use of force and 
deprivation of life constitute a gross violation within international law, and differing 
the two is that the definition of arbitrary takes on different meanings according to 
either the context of human rights law or international humanitarian law. In any case 
lethal use of force have to be followed by trial, investigation and judgement.  
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The terrorist as conceptualised by the US, challenges the specific categories of 
international law, which determines how responsibility can be attributed. As the 
AUMF associated the terrorists to the 9/11 events, a logic of responsibility for these 
events was invoked on unknown individuals. The unknown individuals, subject to 
targeted killings through association with al-Qaeda are then attributed responsibility 
for past and possible future actions. The guilt attributed to the terrorist by the US 
then pose a challenge to the international legal frameworks associating to 
responsibility, as the terrorist is not given trial proving his guilt before judged (and 
killed), and as he is essentially attributed responsibility for something yet to be 
committed. Hence, the unknown terrorist is by the US judged upon characteristics 
assumed to be determining for future wrongful action, rather than judging his 
behaviour as wrongful on the basis of past wrongful events, as international law 
would prescribe trough the right to fair trial. 
Further challenging the international legal system, is that the attribution of 
responsibility is made extraterritorially: As no specific types of terrorist conduct have 
been defined positively as unlawful or ‘terroristic’ internationally  , any judgement 93
must be referred to differing domestic law enforcement models. As such, it may be 
understood that the US expands it’s domestic conceptions of what is unlawful and 
terroristic, when targeting terrorists abroad. Conducting targeted killings in 
transnational ‘hot spots', the US drone program then challenges fundamental citizen-
state logics upon which responsibility of wrongdoing is usually attributed. In the 
attribution of responsibility on the terrorist, the US drone program then challenges 
the international legal project by conceptualising conditions of time and space 
differently. We found that this is largely conditioned by the radical uncertainty 
characterising the threat, which further manifests itself in an anticipation of the next 
terrorist attack as an objective reality. 
Accountability 
Within international law, accountability is assured through legal compliance and 
availability of information and reporting, which lays ground for judgement. The logic 
of reaction conditions that the use of force in self-defence is reported and justified by 
the actors, in order to assure that the legality can be assessed and ‘sealed’ in court. 
Time and events are thus given closure. This we find challenged by the logic of 
precaution in the US drone program. Here, the aim of security surpasses 
!  Council on Foreign Relations in an issue brief on “The Global Regime for 93
Terrorism”: ”no international legal definition of terrorism has been agreed upon. And 
although UN documents provide operational definitions or interpretations of 
customary international law, and existing conventions against terrorism do provide a 
universal legal regime against terrorism, none is comprehensive.“ <http://
www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/global-regime-terrorism/p25729> [accessed 17/12/13, 
23:04]
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transparency, and introduces secrecy as vital to the realisation of the US drone 
program. Whereas international law assures legality and justice of outcomes by 
proceeding on well-defined and available information of law, the US drone program 
maintain security to decide the availability of information. The availability of 
information are seen as weakening security within the US policy, whereas it is seen 
as a condition for establishing whether there have been compliance with pre-existing 
international law. 
We have now, on the basis of our two analyses, outlined challenges posed by the US 
to the institution of international law. From the above, we extract that a fundamental 
difference between the two systems is their particular conception of time. 
Specifically, it is the logic of precaution, inherent in the US drone program, which 
entails a fundamental challenge to international law, because of its ‘expanded' 
conception of time. We find this expansion of time first to be caused by their 
conception of the threat as constant and anticipated, through the idea of the ‘next 
terrorist attack’. This anticipation results in a expansion of imminence: the window 
of opportunity becomes unlimited by time, and evidence on the nature of the threat 
unprovable, by relying only on evidence of a possible future. Ultimately, this 
causation is what is significantly different from, and challenging to, international 
law. Below, we will unfold this discussion. This will allow us to focus on how we 
perceive the concept of time as crucial to understanding the challenge between the 
two systems, when defining legitimate uses of force. 
!
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THE CHALLENGE OF RADICAL UNCERTAINTY TO THE USE OF 
FORCE 
The logic of precaution, embedded in the US’ drone program, fundamentally 
challenges the logic of reaction, structuring what is legitimate use of lethal force 
under international law. 
In order to establish this claim, we have outlined the construction of particular 
chains of significations within both systems, that amounts to the establishment of a 
logic of precaution under US drone program and a logic of reaction under 
international law. Above, we outlined the main conclusions to our analyses and 
established how the contestation between the two system manifested itself in the 
systems. In order to expand on the normative contestation between the two, we will 
point to the discussion of anticipatory self-defence, or preemptive self-defence, as a 
central point of contact between the two, where we might see movement. 
The most central tension between international law and US drone program, is that 
which is present regarding anticipatory self-defence. The lack of clear, codified 
evaluations of the interpretation of Article 51, the principle of self-defence (as well as 
its inherent principles of necessity and proportionality) and the role of anticipatory 
self-defence in customary law, has been the object of debate in a range of cases under 
international law. This tension is exacerbated by the US drone program through its 
logic of precaution, as it inter alia expands the time conception inherent in the 
notion of anticipatory self-defence through both the constancy of the terrorist threat 
as well as through their conception of a window of opportunity. Furthermore, as the 
US drone program is based on anticipatory action, and not on a clear understanding 
of the precise nature of the attack, the overwhelming necessity part of the Caroline 
criteria is further expanded. 
FROM CAROLINE TO EGYPT: THE EXPANSION OF TIME 
From the Caroline case to Israel’s preemptive strike on Egypt in the run-up to the Six 
Day War and up until the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the notion of time has 
been central to ascertaining whether the principle of anticipatory self-defence has 
been applicable under customary international law. As Armstrong, Farrell & Lambert 
(2012: 137) points out, the invocation of preemption in the Iraq war has been widely 
contested for conflating it with notions of prevention and emerging threats, rather 
than solely the presence of overwhelming necessity of reaction to threats that are 
imminent. 
Should we rely on the codification of self-defence in positive law, the definition of 
legitimate self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, states quite clear 
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that self-defence is only legitimate “if an armed attack occurs” (emphasis added). 
Any strict interpretation of this, would fail to acknowledge the principles of 
anticipatory self-defence enshrined in customary law as established by the Caroline 
case. Relying on the logic of reaction established in the analysis, the definition of 
anticipatory self-defence under customary international law relies on the necessity of 
action as well as the overwhelming nature of the threat. In the Israeli attack on 
Egypt, the threat was defined as amounting to an existential threat, caused by the 
encirclement of Israel by the Arab countries with clear evidence of their hostile 
intent.   For the invasion of Afghanistan, the invocation of anticipatory self-defence 94
was established by recourse to the harbouring of Al-Qaeda by the Taliban 
government. Furthermore, the fact that Al-Qaeda had carried out numerous attacks 
on american targets, and failed attempts of countering the attacks in 1998 
established the likelihood of further attacks emanating from Afghanistan and the 
grounds for self-defence, even though the invasion took place a month after 9/11 
(ibid.: 134). 
The three examples outlined here gives a somewhat murky picture of anticipatory 
self-defence in customary law, as the time-span for reacting on threats has seemingly 
expanded over time. The Caroline affair was contested by Webster, on the grounds of 
not being established as sufficiently imminent and the Israeli attack on Egypt was 
likewise established as a surprise attack, where an armed conflict was already under 
way, whereas the invasion of Afghanistan likely expands the time-span of 
imminence, and rather relies on a notion of probability caused by past actions. 
This opening of the time conception within self-defence is exacerbated in by the US 
drone program. The construction of the threat as constant in the US policy and the 
institutionalisation of the threat within the US drone program exacerbates the time 
frame of what can constitute anticipated self-defence. The radical uncertainty of the 
threat, necessitates the preparation and expectation of the next terrorist attack, 
simultaneously precluding the possibility of proportionately and effectively repel the 
attack, as it will never be possible to eliminate the threat totally - as epitomised by a 
CIA analyst: 
“The problem with the drone is it’s like your lawn mower … You’ve 
got to mow the lawn all the time. The minute you stop mowing, the 
grass is going to grow back.” (Miller, 2012) 
!  See above note 17, for the official decision by the Israeli government.94
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The second aspect of the threat constructed within the US drone program, the 
catastrophic element, furthermore challenges the principle of overwhelming 
necessity as a condition for anticipatory self-defence. 
OVERWHELMING NECESSITY: THE NATURE OF THE THREAT 
The catastrophic element of the terrorist threat within US policy is doctrinally 
described by worst-case scenarios and more specifically through the threat of nuclear 
wielding terrorists attacking US territory. Whereas the threat of the Arab countries in 
the Six Day War case were defined as a situation emanating from the diplomatic 
solution between Israel and the surrounding countries, the threats constructed in the 
US policy is highly contingent on the creation of pattern-of-life analyses and 
conjectural knowledge. Consequently, the ability of establishing the legality of the 
action post facto, will in any case be a challenge to consider equally within both 
systems. The availability of information and reporting, in the event that they should 
be delivered, are constructed on the basis of different logics of knowledge creation, 
whereby the ascription of guilt, responsibility or blame (constituting a threat) across 
the two systems are incommensurable. The US are able to deem it evident, based on 
conjectural reasoning and behavioural patterns, that an individual would have 
committed hostile actions if not prevented, therefore legitimising the drone strike 
through anticipated future action. International law would deem it necessary to 
establish evidence of the fact that wrongful behaviour can be linked to a past 
wrongful event. 
Israel’s strike on Egypt’s air-force furthermore accentuates the challenge between the 
systems, as the construction of the threat in the US drone program is based on an 
anticipation of an attack in the future, whereas the Israeli government established a 
state of de facto (at least diplomatically) war, when they launched the preemptive 
attack. Thus, the catastrophic element within the terrorist threat against the US 
invokes doubt as a driver of preemptive action, rather than a constraint on action, as 
invoked in the Caroline criteria, as well as in positive international law, including the 
presumption of innocence under IHRL. 
The US drone program thus develops the notion of preemption from the case of the 
Six Day War, by both invoking no need for establishing the precise nature of the 
threat, as well as precluding the necessity for establishing independent self-defence 
analyses on each drone strike. 
Consequently, the logic of precaution in the US drone program challenges the logic of 
reaction within international law through the invocation of the terrorist threat as 
constant in its reach and catastrophic in its consequences. The terrorist threat thus 
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becomes of constant overwhelming necessity, which makes it significantly different 
from the cases of Egypt and Afghanistan, also challenging the customary principle of 
anticipatory self-defence. 
CONCLUSION 
Aiming at an illumination of the ways in which the US drone program fundamentally 
challenges the system of international law we first established that both systems can 
be considered modes of governance trying to tame uncertainty by invoking different 
means, ideas and rationalities. When analysing structures of the mode of governance 
within the US drone program we found that precaution functions as the structuring 
logic of the system. When analysing the mode of governance within the institution of 
international law, we found a logic of reaction inherent to the structuring of 
legitimate uses of force. 
What we have established is that the US drone program fundamentally challenges 
international law by relying on a logic of precaution, unfolding itself through 
anticipatory actions. We found that use of signature strikes performed by drones 
largely constituted such anticipatory actions conditioned by radical uncertainty. The 
logic of international law, which is first and foremost structured by a logic of 
reaction, we did not however, find to constitute an opening for a precautionary logic, 
as was shown in the way invocations of anticipatory self-defence has played out 
historically. As it is now, the US drone program also challenge the still-contested 
customary practice of anticipatory self-defence. Thus, we argue not that the logics of 
the two systems are incompatible in any essential manner, but rather that the 
understanding of what constitutes legitimate use of force in the US’ particular chains 
of signification shows areas of incommensurability with international law. 
Specifically, we found that the US' understanding of radical uncertainty has 
conditioned an expansion of the conception of time, which fundamentally challenges 
the logic of reaction under international law. 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